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477 
Circuit Splits and Empiricism in 
the Supreme Court 
 
Karen M. Gebbia1 
 
I. Introduction: A Brief Introduction to Empiricism and the 
Supreme Court 
 
Fire sweeps through an old growth forest of sequoia, sugar 
pine and white fir trees.  In the years following the conflagration, 
an observer notices significantly more seedlings growing in 
severely burned areas than in unburned areas.  Why?  Is there 
more space, more water, or more sun in the burned areas?  Has 
the fire, itself, facilitated new growth?  Could it be random 
chance?  Might rigorous comparative studies yield an 
explanation? 
This not entirely fictional tale2 embodies the essence of 
empiricism.  It begins with an observation, identifies hypotheses 
that might plausibly explain the observation, and sets about 
testing these hypotheses through rigorously controlled factual 
 
1. Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, 
formerly Professor of Law, University of Hawaii School of Law; JD cum laude 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
The author thanks Professors Robert Calhoun, Helen Hartnell, Susan Rutberg, 
Jon Sylvester, attendees at two Golden Gate Colloquia, and anonymous 
reviewers for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks are also due 
to Elizabeth Cinque, Class of 2013, and Francisco Martinez, Class of 2017, for 
dedicated research assistance and unfailing good cheer. 
Endless thanks to James M. Barrett, PhD, University of California, Davis, for 
help translating concepts into recognizable statistics and patient tutoring in 
the intricate oddities of STATA. The statistical analyses in the Study also 
benefited from insights garnered from Professors Lee Epstein and Andrew D. 
Martin at the Conducting Empirical Legal Scholarship Workshop, May 2013, 
at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and Professors 
Robert Lawless, Jennifer Robbennolt and Thomas Ulen in their book 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW.   See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL 
METHODS IN LAW (Wolters Kluwer 2010). Any errors are the author’s own and 
no reflection of the brilliance of the coaches. 
2. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kilgore, Fire’s Role in a Sequoia Forest, NATIONAL 
PARKS SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/seki/naturescience/fic_firerole.htm (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
1
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analysis, rather than settling for even the most sophisticated 
theoretical explanation.3 
Empiricism, however, can explain far more than the natural 
world.  In the past two decades, legal scholars have increasingly 
employed empirical methods to probe how the legal system’s 
central actors and institutions function in practice, rather than 
merely in theory.4  Empiricism may add distinct value to 
traditional legal scholarship by testing the validity of theorized 
expectations and identifying trends, patterns and nuances in 
courts’ and legislatures’ decision making processes. 
Consider, for example, Supreme Court review.  The 
dynamics of the review process fundamentally shape the Court’s 
role in fostering the legal system’s essential values5; however, 
 
3. See LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7-20; Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules 
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-3, 19-20 (2002). 
4. See, for example, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010), for 
commentary recognizing the increasing amount of self-consciously empirical 
work in legal scholarship.  See LAWLESS, supra note 1, at xix (noting increase 
in empirical legal scholarship); see also Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, 
Nature and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1713-19 (2011) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Origins] 
(tracing the development of empirical legal scholarship); Theodore Eisenberg, 
Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1741-42 
(2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Why] (noting increase in empirical legal 
scholarship); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical 
Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 527-29 (2000) (noting increase in empirical legal 
scholarship); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 1-2 (same; also urging scholars 
to follow the rules of inference, defining empirical scholarship broadly to 
include much of what others might define as traditional scholarship); Michael 
Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 
1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739 passim (2011) (noting increase in 
empirical legal scholarship); Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The 
Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 passim (2013) (noting 
increase in empirical legal scholarship); see generally sources cited infra note 
7. 
5. Elsewhere, the author has identified eight essential values that 
underlie the legal system: that the law shall be predictable in individual cases, 
replicable in similar cases, horizontally coherent across related fields of law, 
vertically coherent across time, reflective of society’s needs and values, 
responsive to changes in society’s needs and values, influential in shaping 
social values or morals, and fair and just in individual cases. See Karen M. 
Gebbia, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System 
Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233 (1997). See also sources cited supra note 
4. Cf. Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Donelson, Creating Quality Courts, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 490, 491 (2010) (articulating important qualities of 
judicial systems, including that: “The judiciary should be independent . . . . The 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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multiple factors influence each aspect of the process, including 
litigants’ initial determination to request review, the framing of 
the issues presented, the Justices’ decision whether to accept the 
case, and the Justices’ individual votes on the merits.  
Consequently, the Court’s (theoretical) power of final review is 
continually balanced against the (practical) reality that 
litigants’ selection discretion significantly constrains Supreme 
Court review, and the Court’s own limited docket prevents it 
from reviewing every case the lower courts decide. 
Scholars have explored diverse and interrelated aspects of 
Supreme Court review, including: the rich variety of roles the 
Court plays (including correcting errors, resolving circuit splits, 
fostering uniformity, resolving constitutional questions, and 
signaling other actors); the dynamics of the certiorari process 
(including litigants’ decisions to seek certiorari, the Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari, work load considerations, and 
messages the Court’s choices send lower courts);6 and the ways 
 
judiciary should be accessible . . . . The judiciary should be reasonably efficient 
and effective. . . All these features are part of establishing a ‘rule of law.’”); 
Reid Hastie, The Challenge to Produce Useful ‘Legal Numbers,’ 8 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 6, 7 (2011) (articulating the “desired, normative properties of legal 
numbers” as reliability, equity, accuracy, predictability, and justice). 
Commentators may disagree on how the values that define a legal system 
ought to be balanced, or allocated among the players in the legal system; 
nevertheless, empirical study enhances understanding of how legal 
institutions actually pursue these aspirations. 
6. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE US COURTS OF 
APPEALS (Standford Univ. Press 2007) (examining factors influencing appellate 
decision making); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (examining 
decision making on certiorari); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2002) (examining ideological impacts on Supreme Court decision 
making); Gregory Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the 
Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (considering Supreme Court 
decision making in granting certiorari); Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic 
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme 
Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 103 (2000) (considering 
factors affecting the Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant certiorari); 
Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 369 (2005) (examining why lower courts adhere to Supreme Court 
precedent); Paul H. Edelman et al., Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the 
Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129 (2012) (examining whether 
ideology and the attitudinal model of decision making explain Supreme Court 
consensus); Paul H. Edelman et al., Measuring Deviations from Expected 
Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008) 
3
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in which broad models of judicial decision making illuminate the 
Court’s and litigants’ decisions (including the effects of 
attitudinal, institutional and legal factors, and of appellate 
 
(examining factors that might explain Supreme Court Justices’ deviations from 
voting behavior that would be expected if one applied the attitudinal model of 
judicial decision making); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme 
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 
(2007) (examining implications of ideological change on the Supreme Court); 
Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Access 
Supreme Court Justices, With Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological 
Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1891 (2007) (examining measures of Supreme Court 
Justices’ ideology and the implications of ideological change); Tracey E. George 
& Michael E. Solamine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts 
of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001) (considering whether the 
Supreme Court is any more or less likely to consider circuit court decisions 
heard en banc rather than by a panel); Bernard Grofman & Timothy Brazill, 
Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through 
Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953-1991, 112 PUB. 
CHOICE 55 (2002) (examining Supreme Court decision making); Jonathan P. 
Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics, 5 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008) (considering how case selection affects 
inferences regarding judicial politics, including regarding Supreme Court 
decision making and lower court compliance with Supreme Court signals); 
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007) 
(challenging the “principal-agent” theory of lower court compliance with 
Supreme Court policy making); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of 
Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
579 (2003) (examining whether lower courts comply with Supreme Court 
signals to avoid reversal); Maxwell Mak et al., Is Certiorari Contingent on 
Litigant Behavior? Petitioners’ Role in Strategic Auditing, 10 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 54 (2013) (exploring inter-dependence between litigant selection 
discretion and Supreme Court selection discretion); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin 
M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 365 (2007) (examining implications of ideological change on the 
Supreme Court); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (exploring, in a classic work, the 
implications of litigants’ decision making in selecting cases for litigation); Rorie 
Spill Solberg & Stephanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism: 
Judicial Behavior in Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 
1986-2000, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237 (2006) (examining the impact of 
Supreme Court Justices’ ideology on voting regarding constitutional challenges 
to legislation); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a 
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (examining circuit court response to Supreme Court 
signals and directives); Jeff Yates et al., Judicial Ideology and the Selection of 
Disputes for US Supreme Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 847 
(2013) (examining the relationship between the attitudinal model of judicial 
decision making on the Supreme Court and the effects of selection discretion 
by litigants and the Court). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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panel composition and Court composition).7 
Traditional legal scholarship and empirical legal 
scholarship8 each contribute to our understanding of the 
 
7. See sources cited supra note 6; see generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY & 
FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE 
DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (Princeton Univ. Press 2011) (challenging the 
adequacy of the attitudinal model to explain judicial decision making); SEGAL 
& SPAETH, supra note 6 (exploring and comparing rival models of judicial 
decision making, including the attitudinal model and refinements to it); 
Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial 
Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (2011) (noting how institutional models of 
decision making, including principal-agent models, improve upon simple 
attitudinal models, but challenging the ability of principal-agent models to 
account for legal norms); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in 
Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 497-98 (2006) (identifying the three predominant 
theories of judicial decision making as “legal,” “attitudinal,” and “strategic;” 
exploring how well these models describe decision making in securities 
litigation); Keren Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models 
of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective 
From Israel, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 556, 556-65 (2011) (comparing legal, 
attitudinal, rational choice, and neo-institutional models; applying these 
models to contrast the high courts’ decision making in the United States and 
Israel).  Cf. Paresh Kumar Narayan & Russell Smyth, What Explains Dissent 
on the High Court of Australia? An Empirical Assessment Using a 
Cointegration and Error Correction Approach, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 401 
(2007) (examining how institutional, socio-economic and stylistic factors affect 
dissent on Australia’s high court). There is also a growing body of work 
examining the interaction between ideology and panel composition on the 
courts of appeal. See, e.g., Carlos Berdejo, Is it the Journey or the Destination?: 
Judicial Preferences and Decision-Making in the Ninth Circuit, 51 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 271 (2013) (examining the effects of ideology and panel 
composition in the Ninth Circuit); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting 
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L . REV. 301 
(2004) (examining the effect of panel composition on ideological voting in the 
appellate courts). 
8. In this Article, “empirical legal scholarship” is distinguished from 
“traditional legal scholarship” by the presence (in the former) of self-conscious 
factual investigation and experimentation using controlled and comprehensive 
data (rather than solely theory, anecdote and example), to test theoretical 
explanations of observed phenomena. It is not essential to this definition that 
statistical analysis is employed (although it often will be necessary to explain 
the relationships among variables or the significance of observed differences 
among datasets), or that inference be drawn (although it, too, will be necessary 
to any study that seeks to draw broader inferences from specific observed 
phenomena). Cf. LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7 (“By the term empirical methods 
we mean, at the most general level, all techniques for systematically gathering, 
describing, and critically analyzing data (objective information about the 
world.”) (emphasis in original); Eisenberg, Origins, supra note 4, at 1719 (“ELS 
scholars use tools that have long been used in and out of law schools. ELS 
5
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complex interactions among these variables and the dynamic 
relationship between the Court and the circuit courts of appeal.9  
Legal scholarship often seeks to go beyond illumination, 
however. It has the potential, indeed often forthright objective, 
of influencing policy-making and driving institutional reform.10  
Empirical study, in particular, carries an aura of almost 
scientific veracity that policy makers may find harder to 
discount than even the most persuasive theory.  It is particularly 
critical, therefore, that empirical studies proceed from rigorous, 
valid, and reliable foundations by applying accurate data to test 
 
employs a methodology that is usually, but not always, the methodology of 
statistical analysis--parts of which are used by most scholars with a social 
scientific interest in legal issues.”); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 1-2 
(defining empirical scholarship broadly to include any research that involves 
learning about the world using quantitative data or qualitative information; 
noting that “[t]he word ‘empirical’ denotes evidence about the world based on 
observation or experience;” and arguing that legal scholars have been 
“conducting research that is empirical – that is, learning about the world using 
quantitative data or qualitative information – for almost as long as they have 
been conducting research”); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 
26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 810 (1999) (limiting his discussion of “empirical legal 
scholarship” to work that applies statistical analysis to describe or draw 
inferences regarding larger samples); Craig Nard, Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and the 
Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 349 (1995) (describing empirical 
research as generally involving statistical analysis). 
9. This Article focuses on the Court’s review of court of appeals decisions, 
which constitute the largest part of the Court’s docket, and give rise to the 
empirical concerns this Article addresses. 
10. See, e.g., UCLA-RAND Center For Law & Public Policy, UCLA LAW 
(2015) https://www.law.ucla.edu/centers/interdisciplinary-studies/ucla-rand-
center-for-law-and-public-policy/about/ (“The UCLA-RAND Center for Law 
and Public Policy produces legal scholarship grounded in multidisciplinary 
empirical analysis to guide legal and public policymakers in the 21st century.”); 
Eisenberg, Why, supra note 4, at 1743-46 (noting public policy interest in 
empirical legal studies). As Epstein and King explain:  
 
[L]egal scholarship – perhaps to a greater degree and more 
immediately than most other research – has the potential to 
influence public policy as it is promulgated by judges, 
legislators, and bureaucrats. It is especially so when that 
influence comes in studies assessing the likely consequences 
of particular changes in public policy, evaluating the impact 
of existing public programs, or affecting the real world in a 
timely manner. 
 
Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 7 (footnotes omitted). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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carefully constructed hypotheses. 
This Article demonstrates, empirically rather than merely 
in theory, how a failure to do so leads to unreliable conclusions 
concerning the relationship between the Supreme Court and the 
circuit courts of appeal.  Specifically, commentators routinely 
misapply facially accurate raw data regarding the rate at which 
the Court reverses circuit court decisions to support unreliable 
conclusions regarding the comparative degree of accord between 
the Court and individual circuits. Commentators and the 
popular press then employ these unreliable conclusions to draw 
unsupported inferences regarding the reasons for supposed 
discord between the Court and the circuits, and to urge 
fundamental institutional reforms ranging from dividing 
circuits to creating intermediate levels of judicial review.11 
Part II of this Article provides context for this Study by 
reviewing the principal ways in which empiricists employ raw 
data and inquiry-based analysis to study Supreme Court review 
practices.  Part III examines how raw data and inquiry-based 
analysis apply to the question of Supreme Court / circuit court 
accord, explains how circuit splits and other factors affect 
apparent rates of accord, and distinguishes simple Supreme 
Court case disposition data (“affirm / reverse” rates, which do 
not account for circuit splits) from more comprehensive “approve 
/ abrogate” rates (which do account for circuit splits).  Part IV 
defines the two datasets this Article uses to compare affirm / 
reverse rates to approve / abrogate rates, and outlines the 
methods and parameters of the Study. Part V elaborates the 
Study’s findings regarding the differences between affirm / 
reverse rates and approve / abrogate rates, demonstrates that 
affirm / reverse rates do not reliably reflect the degree to which 
the Court agrees with the circuit courts of appeal, either in the 
aggregate, or on a circuit-by-circuit comparative basis, and 
considers what these data suggest about other variables, such as 
issue disparity, that may fundamentally impact Supreme Court 
/ circuit court accord.  Part VI summarizes these conclusions, 
makes recommendations regarding the interpretation and 
application of Supreme Court review data, and identifies areas 
for further study. 
 
11. See infra nn. 69-74. 
7
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II. Empirical Perspectives on the Supreme Court 
 
Empirical analysis of the Supreme Court follows two 
primary paths.  The first reports comprehensive raw data; the 
second engages in inquiry-based analysis.  Part II of this Article 
summarizes and considers the intersections between raw data 
reports (Part II.A) and inquiry-based analysis (Part II.B), in the 
context of empirical study of the Supreme Court. 
 
A. Raw Data Reports 
 
Raw data publishers strive to make accurate information 
regarding Supreme Court decision making available to scholars 
and the public.  To do so, they first identify potentially 
interesting variables regarding Supreme Court cases (and 
perhaps regarding petitions filed with the Court). Variables 
might include, for example, the case’s origin, nature of the 
issues, disposition of the case, voting coalitions, opinion author, 
etc.  Raw data reporters then compile these data and publish 
them in summary reports or searchable databases.12 
The complexity of the data-reporting enterprise depends on 
the nature of the variables reported, the degree of analysis and 
decision making required to assign values to the reported 
variables (i.e., to “code”13 them), and the reporting format (such 
as whether the compiler reports individual case data or 
aggregate Term data). 
 
12. See, e.g., databases discussed infra Part II.A; see generally LAWLESS, 
supra note 1, at 7, 125-38 (discussing availability of and access to public and 
archival data); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 22-24 (commenting on the 
practice by which large amounts of data are made publically available for 
general research rather than developed in response to a particular inquiry). 
13. See generally LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 165-87 (noting the challenges 
of coding variables in empirical legal studies); see also Michael Evans et al., 
Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance 
Empirical Legal Research, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1007, 1008-09 (2007) 
(noting the tension between large-scale inquiry of “thin,” reliably coded 
observations and small-scale inquiry of more nuanced variables that present 
greater coding challenges); Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil 
Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60 
(2013) (advocating mandatory party coding of case-related variables in all 
federal filings to enhance civil rulemaking). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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Variables that may be reported based upon generally non-
controversial coding decisions include numbers of petitions for 
certiorari filed and granted, numbers of cases resolved with and 
without opinion, numbers of merits cases decided, origin of 
cases,14 simple case disposition,15 opinion author, vote splits, 
voting alignments, and the like. Harvard Law Review16 and 
SCOTUSBlog17 produce the most well-recognized summaries of 
these types of Supreme Court decision making data.18  Each 
publishes an annual report that summarizes these data for the 
Court’s most recently completed Term (the former since the 1948 
 
14. SCOTUSBlog reports case origin in four categories: circuit courts of 
appeal, state supreme courts, three judge district courts, and original 
jurisdiction. See generally SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter SCOTUSBlog]; Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG 
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/statistics/ [hereinafter SCOTUSBlog 
Statistics]. HARVARD LAW REVIEW reports sixteen categories of case origin: 
district courts, armed forces, state courts, and each of the thirteen circuit 
courts of appeal. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2012 Term: The Statistics, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 408, 418 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 Term]. 
15. Simple case disposition includes affirmed, reversed, vacated, 
remanded, and the like. 
16. Each November since 1949, HARVARD LAW REVIEW has published 
statistics for the previous Supreme Court Term.  See The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415 n.1 (2005) (noting history of 
the statistics issue) [hereinafter 2004 Term].  The most recent report is 
available at 2012 Term, supra note 14. 
17. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14. 
18. See also Supreme Court Database, infra note 40 and text 
accompanying notes 41– 44, which reports these same variables, as well as 
extensive additional variables. 
Other sources of various Supreme Court data include: LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed. 
2012); Journal, SUPREME COURT (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx (“The Journal reflects the 
disposition of each case, names the court whose judgment is under review, lists 
the cases argued that day and the attorneys who presented oral argument . . 
.”); Judicial Business 2013 Tables, US COURTS (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/statistical-tables-
us-supreme-court.aspx (setting forth cases on docket, disposed of, and 
remaining on docket at conclusion of October Terms for the most recent five-
year period; also summarizing for each Term, the numbers of cases argued, 
disposed of by full opinion, disposed of by per curiam decisions, set for re-
argument, granted review, reviewed and decided without oral argument, and 
available for argument at the outset of the following term); THE UNITED STATES 
CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0331.pdf (setting 
forth, at Table 331, Supreme Court Cases filed and disposition, 1980 to 2010). 
9
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Term;19 the latter since the 1995 Term20).  Where it seems useful, 
each publishes data both in the aggregate and disaggregated by 
circuit.21 
Although these resources refer to their reports as 
“statistics,” as a matter of common parlance, the reports actually 
comprise raw totals or percentages for specified variables, 
without comparative statistical analysis, which might account 
for factors such as sample size, weight, probability, significance 
and the like.  The distinction may be important. For example, 
suppose that for a particular period, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the circuit courts of appeal, in the aggregate, on average, 
around 45% of the time, but agreed with the Tenth Circuit 
around 53% of the time during this same period.  One might be 
tempted to ask why the Tenth Circuit has a better record.  The 
first inquiry, however, must be whether the seeming difference 
is statistically meaningful given the numbers of cases 
considered.  In this example, the difference has no greater 
significance than random chance.22 
Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog also identify the 
types of cases the Court has decided on the merits, which is a 
somewhat more substantive variable than those mentioned 
above.  The extent to which classification based upon the nature 
of a case presents coding challenges depends on the complexity 
of the issues and the specificity of the chosen taxonomy.  
SCOTUSBlog reports four categories of merits cases, namely: 
civil, criminal, habeas corpus, and original jurisdiction.23  
Harvard Law Review reports six subject matter categories for 
cases disposed of with full opinions, namely: civil cases from the 
federal courts, federal criminal cases, federal habeas corpus 
cases, civil cases from the state courts, state criminal cases, and 
 
19. The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARV. L. REV. 119 (1949); see 2004 
Term, supra note 16, at 415 n.1 (noting history of the statistics issue). 
20. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14 (including reports for the 1995 
through 2013 Terms). 
21. See sources cited supra note 14. 
22. See infra Table III, Figure 8, and accompanying text. 
23. See SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14 (reporting “make up of the 
merits docket” beginning with the 2010 Term; reporting “questions presented 
and results” for the 2008 and 2009 Terms on a case-by-case but not summary 
basis; reporting a “case list” with “holdings” but not issues for the 2007 Term; 
and not reporting a nature of the case summary for earlier Terms). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.24  Placing cases 
into the broad categories these reports employ does not typically 
require controversial coding decisions. 
The breadth of these categories may, however, be somewhat 
unsatisfactory to a researcher interested in exploring either a 
narrower subset of cases (e.g., all taxation or bankruptcy 
questions), or a broader group of cases that crosses categories 
(e.g., all constitutional questions). Harvard Law Review 
separates its six broad categories into subcategories based upon 
the statute, rule, constitutional provision, or legal doctrine 
presented.25  Because the Court typically issues fewer than 
eighty decisions per Term, and typically does not review 
multiple cases presenting similar issues, this level of taxonomy 
often reports a single case observation in many of the subject 
matter subcategories.26  For example, in the category of “federal 
criminal” cases, Harvard Law Review employs five 
subcategories, each with one case observation, to describe the 
2005 Term cases,27 and nine subcategories, each with one case 
observation, to describe the 2012 Term cases.28  Separately, it 
identifies eight subcategories of “federal habeas corpus” cases for 
the 2005 Term (one with four case observations),29 and seven for 
the 2012 Term (two with two case observations).30  SCOTUSBlog 
 
24. See, e.g., 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 420-22. 
25. For example, the October 2012 Term Report identifies six “state 
criminal cases” (comprising one double jeopardy, four search and seizure, and 
one self-incrimination case) and nine federal habeas corpus cases (comprising 
one case addressing each of five separate issues, rules, or laws, and two cases 
addressing each of two other issues, rules, or laws).  Id. at 422. 
26. For example, for the seventy-eight decisions reported for the October 
2012 Term,  HARVARD LAW REVIEW creates sixty-two subcategories, only 
thirteen of which have more than one case reported (eleven subcategories 
record two cases each, one subcategory records three cases, and one 
subcategory records four cases). Id. at 420-22. 
27. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 
384 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Term] (categorizing cases as federal criminal 
procedure, right to counsel, search and seizure, speedy trial act, and statutory 
interpretation). 
28. 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422 (categorizing cases as Armed Career 
Criminal Act, ex post facto, federal conspiracy law, federal rules of criminal 
procedure, Hobbs Act, plain error review, right to jury trial, search and seizure, 
and Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). 
29. 2005 Term, supra note 27. 
30. 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422. 
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does not subcategorize beyond the four broad categories noted; 
however, it does separately accord each merits decision its own 
case page.31 
Any taxonomy that classifies cases into narrow categories 
offers users the flexibility of selecting, refining, and aggregating 
data suitable to their individual inquiries.  Nevertheless, in even 
the most well-constructed taxonomy, increasing specificity 
simultaneously increases subjectivity at at least two levels.  
First, reasonable coders might create different taxonomies (in 
general or for different purposes).  For example, one person 
might classify civil cases according to whether they present 
questions of federal or state law, while two others might apply 
doctrinal categories, but at different levels of specificity (e.g., 
commercial law, as compared to commercial transactions, 
consumer protection, real property, corporations, bankruptcy, 
etc.).  Second, reasonable coders might make different coding 
decisions with respect to individual cases, particularly if those 
cases present multiple issues or the interaction of legal 
doctrines.  For example, a case presenting an interaction 
between the Bankruptcy Code and state probate law might be 
classified as civil, probate, bankruptcy, supremacy clause, 
federalism, constitutional, all of the above, or perhaps something 
else.32 
The more subjective the coding decisions become, the 
greater care end users must exercise in selecting the cases or 
categories to be studied, precisely defining their selection 
criteria, and fully appreciating the coding decisions the reporters 
have made. Consider two more or less random illustrations of 
the types of errors that might otherwise arise. 
First, a bankruptcy expert might consider three of the 
 
31. See SCOTUSBlog, supra note 14. 
32. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (presenting these 
tensions); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (presenting these 
tensions).  See Christina L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: 
Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 253 (2013) (exploring taxonomy generally in varied legal contexts and 
considering how lawsuits might be classified); Evans, supra note 13 (exploring 
the use of automated text classification to enhance consistency in coding the 
content of legal texts); Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of 
Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules with Classification Trees, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010) (applying decision trees to categorize and illuminate 
legal reasoning). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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Supreme Court’s 2005 Term cases to be bankruptcy cases, 
namely: Marshall v. Marshall,33 Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz,34 and Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich 
American Insurance Company.35  Each at least arguably 
implicates non-bankruptcy concerns as well.  Harvard Law 
Review, in comparison, reports only two “bankruptcy” cases 
among fifty-one “civil cases from the federal courts” during the 
2005 Term.36  The report does not identify the cases by name, 
and reasonable people making an educated guess might disagree 
on which of these three cases is most logically classified as 
something other than a bankruptcy case.  Consequently, a 
researcher using this report would need to inquire further and 
hope to locate a more detailed explanation of the coding 
decision.37  Moreover, a researcher interested in engaging in 
statistical analysis of the Court’s bankruptcy cases over some 
period of years might simply miss one of the three 2005 Term 
“bankruptcy” cases if the researcher had not: first, 
independently determined that there ought to be three 
bankruptcy cases in the 2005 Term; second, compared her own 
determination to the determination the compilers of the 2005 
Term report made; and finally, made an affirmative choice 
 
33. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (holding that the “probate 
exception” does not deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over debtor’s 
tort suit against a third party). 
34. Cent. VA Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (holding that state 
agencies’ sovereign immunity does not preclude bankruptcy trustee’s 
preference action against the agencies). 
35. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006) 
(holding that unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums were not 
contributions to an employee benefit plan for purposes of priority under 11 
U.S.C. § 507). 
36. See 2005 Term, supra note 27, at 382. 
37. In comparison, SCOTUSBlog presumably would classify each of these 
cases as “civil litigation” (rather than criminal, habeas corpus, or original 
jurisdiction) under its current classification scheme.  See infra Table III, Figure 
8, and accompanying text. In 2005, it did not summarize cases by “nature of 
the case.” It did, however, provide a link to a summary report prepared by the 
Georgetown Supreme Court Institute.  See GEO. U. L. CTR FINAL SUP. CT. INST., 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2005 OVERVIEW, 
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/movabletype/archives/GULCSupCtInstituteFin
alReportOT2005_30June06.pdf (listing Katz and Howard as bankruptcy cases, 
and Marshall as a federal civil procedure case). See also Karl  Blanke, The 
Numbers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2006, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/2006/06/the-numbers/. 
13
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whether to include two or three 2005 Term bankruptcy cases in 
her study. 
Similarly, replicability challenges may arise if different 
reporting resources make different coding decisions.  For 
example, Harvard Law Review reports nine federal habeas 
corpus cases in its table of federal criminal cases disposed of with 
full opinions during the October 2012 Term.38 SCOTUSBlog, in 
comparison, reports six habeas corpus cases on the merits docket 
in the October 2012 Term.39  Separately, SCOTUSBlog provides 
detailed case pages that might, or might not, allow a careful 
researcher to determine which cases it has included in the six.40  
If similar disparities existed over many years in these summary 
reports, a researcher amalgamating two decades worth of 
habeas corpus data (for example) could reach apparently 
different (non-replicable) conclusions depending on which source 
she employed and whether she undertook to reconcile apparent 
conflicts. 
These examples illustrate why end users must review the 
reporter’s coding decisions carefully, even with respect to 
apparently straightforward variables, such as the nature of the 
case.  Other substantive coding decisions may present 
significantly greater nuance than subject matter taxonomy and, 
therefore, even greater need for care by both compilers and 
users.  These data might include, for example, reasons the Court 
accepted the case, determinative legal provisions, qualitative 
characterization of the decision and its direction, and the like.41  
 
38. See 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422. 
39. See Make-Up of the Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), 
http://SCOTUSBlog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/makeup_OT12.pdf. 
40. One might attempt to deduce the rationale underlying the coding 
taxonomy differences by comparing the issues reported on each of the seventy-
odd individual SCOTUSBlog case pages for that Term to the seven sub-
categories of issues HARVARD LAW REVIEW identifies as federal habeas corpus 
cases (namely, AEDPA, AEDPA deference, competency, confrontation clause, 
federal rules of appellate procedure, retroactivity, right to counsel). 
Again in comparison, the Supreme Court Database identifies only three habeas 
corpus cases (one having two issues, and therefore being reported as two 
observations) under its “issue” variable for the 2012 Term. See discussion infra 
at text accompanying notes 41-42.  It records two additional cases as 
presenting “ineffective counsel” issues. See THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter 
Supreme Court Database]. 
41. HARVARD  LAW REVIEW, for example, reports whether decisions were 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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The Supreme Court Database,42 which has served as an essential 
resource for many empirical studies, is the principal, 
authoritative resource for these more nuanced and 
comprehensive types of data.43 
The Supreme Court Database was conceived and developed 
by Harold Spaeth, who became a lawyer after many years as a 
political science professor and scholar.44  Other leading 
empiricists subsequently expanded and enhanced the Supreme 
Court Database.  This database codes and reports nearly 250 
variables, include multiple variables concerning case 
identification, chronology, origin, jurisdictional basis, reasons 
the Court accepted the case, nature of the substantive issues, 
governing law, direction, outcome, voting, and the like, for each 
Supreme Court case decided during and since the 1946 Term.45 
The Supreme Court Database differs from the Harvard Law 
Review and SCOTUSBlog summary reports in several ways.  
Substantively, it records a significantly greater number of 
variables, many of which are more subjective than those 
 
in favor of or against the government. See, e.g., 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 
422. 
42. See Supreme Court Database, supra note 40. 
43. See infra note 44. 
44. Harold Spaeth, PhD University of Cincinnati (political science), JD 
University of Michigan, serves as Research Professor of Law and Emeritus 
Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. See Harold J. 
Spaeth, Emeriti Faculty, DEPT. OF POL. SCI., MICH. ST. U. (2005), 
http://polisci.msu.edu/index.php/people/emeriti-faculty. 
45. See Supreme Court Database, supra note 40, at “About” section, noting 
that the database contains: 
 
247 pieces of information for each case, roughly broken down 
into six categories: (1) identification variables (e.g., citations 
and docket numbers); (2) background variables (e.g., how the 
Court took jurisdiction, origin and source of the case, the 
reason the Court agreed to decide it); (3) chronological 
variables (e.g., the date of decision, term of Court, natural 
court); (4) substantive variables (e.g., legal provisions, issues, 
direction of decision); (5) outcome variables (e.g., disposition 
of the case, winning party, formal alteration of precedent, 
declaration of unconstitutionality); and (6) voting and opinion 
variables (e.g., how the individual justices voted, their 
opinions and interagreements). 
 
Id. 
15
  
492 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
reported by the other compilers.  The database format is also 
dramatically different than the by-Term summary snapshots 
Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog offer.  Snapshot 
summaries allow users to compare or aggregate cases across 
Terms, but only within the categories reported.  The Supreme 
Court Database, in contrast, does not summarize data by Term 
or otherwise.  Rather, it presents its raw data in a traditional 
spreadsheet format.  Researchers using the database are free to 
create their own data compilations by selecting the variables 
relevant to their own specific inquiries (such as particular years, 
issues, courts, justices, etc., or any combination thereof). 
The Supreme Court Database provides a variety of tools that 
enable researchers to retrieve data within the parameters of 
their inquiries.  In the past, researchers using the Supreme 
Court Database typically manipulated and analyzed their 
chosen data using a traditional statistical analysis interface 
(such as STATA or SAS).  More recently, the Supreme Court 
Database developed an interface that is more intuitive and user-
friendly for scholars who are familiar with standard search 
engine technology (such as Google), but are not practiced in 
statistical analysis.  For example, without engaging in 
“statistical analysis,” a user can easily generate and compare 
lists of, say, all habeas corpus cases and criminal non-habeas 
corpus cases decided on the merits during selected Supreme 
Court Terms. 
Despite their different approaches, the Supreme Court 
Database, Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog share a 
central conviction: publishing open access,46 authoritative data 
regarding Supreme Court decision making, assiduously divorced 
from biases and presumptions, may facilitate understanding of 
the Court’s actual practices by enabling researchers to apply 
data to diverse inquiries without devoting extensive time to data 
development.47 
 
46. Each of these resources is publicly available via the internet.  The 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW “statistics issue” is also available in print.  See, e.g., 
supra note 16. 
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 12; Erin Miller, New Supreme Court 
Database, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 12, 2009, 1:24 PM), 
www.scotusblog.com/2009/11/new-supreme-court-database (discussing the 
Supreme Court Database). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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As the simple examples offered above illustrate, however, 
end users must critically examine the structure and substance 
of the data reported.48  Some tension among different compilers’ 
respective taxonomy and coding choices is almost inevitable; and 
no source has attempted to devise a comprehensive evaluation 
of the degree of accord (or discord) among them.  Far more 
essentially, even a researcher who fully appreciates the 
compilers’ coding decisions and reconciles apparent 
inconsistencies may err if she fails to appreciate the limits of the 
data reported.  Raw data reports, regardless of their format or 
rigor, are simply tools.  The extent to which they provide 
accurate insight is wholly dependent on the questions a 
researcher asks the data to answer. 
Two fundamental principles build the bridge between raw 
data and useful, reliable conclusions.  First, data are relevant 
only in the context of inquiry-based analysis.  Second, data 
cannot yield an accurate response to an inquiry if the data do 
not coherently and comprehensively capture the information 
necessary to test that inquiry. 
Failure to apply these principles in the context of Supreme 
Court case disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) leads to 
unreliable conclusions regarding the relative degree of harmony 
between the Court and the various circuits.  The unreliability of 
these conclusions arises not from a failure of the data reporting 
services but, rather, from the ends to which the data are applied.  
Routinely reported case disposition data simply do not capture 
the information necessary to draw valid conclusions regarding 
harmony between the Court and the circuits.  To illuminate this 
seeming anomaly, Part B provides a brief overview of inquiry-
based empirical analysis. 
 
B. Raw Data in the Context of Inquiry-Based Analysis 
 
Empirical study is self-consciously inquiry based.  
Researchers make an observation, develop hypotheses, 
formulate research protocols, and apply relevant data to test 
hypothesized relationships (qualitative, quantitative, or 
 
48. See supra text accompanying notes 32–40. 
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descriptive) among variables.49  Given this process, gathering 
data would generally appear to be an exercise that follows the 
development of a hypothesis.  Today, however, vast amounts of 
data exist in the public domain.  With regard to Supreme Court 
decision making in particular, the Supreme Court Database, 
SCOTUSBlog and Harvard Law Review offer a trove of 
publically accessible data.  They do not, however, contain all of 
the data necessary to address every potential inquiry one might 
ponder regarding the Supreme Court’s review practices.  The 
nature of each specific inquiry dictates whether a researcher 
may rely upon these resources, must develop new data, or both.  
A few recent examples are illustrative. 
First, many studies of the Court’s practices rely heavily on 
the Supreme Court Database.50  Others studies begin with this 
database, then add data or means of applying the data, as 
required by their hypotheses.  For example, when Professors 
Clayton and Pickerill sought to determine whether the “New 
Right” had successfully altered the Court’s criminal justice 
jurisprudence, they (i) selected all orally argued cases with 
opinions from the Supreme Court Database “criminal procedure” 
field,51 (ii) analyzed case dispositions and voting patterns from 
those cases,52 (iii) developed a method of using the political 
parties’ national platforms to identify shifting positions with 
respect to criminal justice policy,53 and (iv) compared trends in 
the Justices’ decisions to changes in national party platforms.54 
 
49. See generally LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7-20; Epstein & King, supra 
note 3, at 1-2, 19-20. 
50. For a typical example, see Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in 
the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013) (drawing two data subsets 
from the Supreme Court Database to test hypotheses regarding the Court’s 
treatment of businesses). 
51. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal 
Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal 
Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1411 (2006) (concluding that the 
Supreme Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence tracks electoral politics). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1411-12. 
54. Id. at 1412-15.  See Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the 
United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
395 (2002) (selecting statutory decisions from the Supreme Court Database, 
applying established measures of judicial policy preferences, and gauging 
constraints under different models of the legislative process, to determine 
whether Justices engage in dynamic agenda setting in the context of the 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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Still other studies exploring the relationship between the 
Court and the circuit courts of appeal must develop their data 
with little, if any, support from publically reported data 
regarding Supreme Court practices.  For example, Professors 
Songer, Segal and Cameron have considered whether circuit 
courts act as “agents” that follow Supreme Court policy 
preferences rather than their own policy preferences.55  To test 
the principal / agent model, they devised a fact-pattern analysis 
that measures circuit courts’ congruence with and 
responsiveness to the Court.56  They then drew a random sample 
of circuit court cases over a thirty-year period in one area of law 
(search and seizure), coded variables, and applied the data they 
had developed to their hypotheses.57 
Each of these studies begins by scrupulously determining 
what data are necessary to test its specific inquiry regarding the 
Court’s review practices.  Whether they are able to produce valid 
studies based exclusively on publicly available raw data, or 
whether they must develop other or additional data, depends 
entirely on the extent to which publically reported data capture 
the information necessary to test their hypotheses. 
In contrast to these studies, Part III differentiates the data 
that are publically available regarding Supreme Court case 
disposition from the data that would be necessary to test 
hypotheses regarding the Court’s relative degree of accord with 
the circuits.  Part III then elaborates the methods this Study 
applies to determine whether the former can reliably be applied 
to the question of Supreme Court / circuit court accord. 
 
III. Raw Data and Inquiry: Reversal Rates, Agreement and 
Circuit Splits 
 
A. Overview of Reversal Rates and the Question of Agreement 
 
A simple definition of “agreement” captures the essence of 
the discussion surrounding Supreme Court / circuit court accord.  
 
decision to grant certiorari). 
55. Songer, supra note 6, at  673. 
56. Id. at 677. 
57. Id. at 681. 
19
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Agreement means a “harmony of opinion, action or character.”58  
Some scholars attempt to measure harmony directly, by 
developing models of ideological accord.59  Others seek objective 
manifestations of accord by comparing judicial decisions of the 
Court and the circuits.60  One seeking an objective measure of 
 
58. Agreement, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/agreement?show=0&t=1419625780 (last visited Dec. 
16, 2015). 
59. Among the most well-recognized of such measures are Martin-Quinn 
Scores.  A summary of Martin-Quinn scores, links to scholarship developing 
and applying these scores, and related materials are available at Project 
Description, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visisted 
Dec. 16, 2015).  See, e.g., Songer, supra note 6 (analyzing circuit court 
responsiveness to the Supreme Court). 
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Brookings Inst. Press 2006) (referencing 
efforts to correlate or understand relationships between judicial performance 
and ideology); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009) (categorizing circuit court judges into “clusters” that 
display similar decision making characteristics, based primarily on Supreme 
Court review and reversal); Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial 
Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163 (2006) (considering whether fear of reversal dampens 
circuit judges’ pursuit of ideological preferences); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 
90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004) (analyzing appellate judge decision making and 
ideology in fourteen areas of law; finding that panel composition affects 
decision making). 
On efforts to forecast or predict Supreme Court voting behavior, based on 
ideology and other models, see generally Josh Blackman et al., Fantasy 
SCOTUS Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the Supreme Court, 10 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 125, 126 (2012) (analyzing the accuracy of Fantasy 
SCOTUS to “test the power of the wisdom of the crowd” by predicting Supreme 
Court behavior; comparing results to Supreme Court Forecasting Project 
results); Charles M. Cameron & Jee-Kwang Park, How Will They Vote? 
Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2006, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 485 (2009) (developing a measure of Supreme Court 
nominees’ ideology to predict voting behavior); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004) 
(discussing a collaborative project that considers legal and political science 
models of predicting Supreme Court behavior); Play FantasySCOTUS, THE 
HARLAN INST. (2012), http://harlaninstitute.org/sliders/fantasyscotus-org/ 
(offering a “Supreme Court Fantasy League” that allows participants to “Play 
Like the 10th Justice”). 
60. “Objective,” here, refers to overtly expressed, and non-controversially 
quantifiable variables, such as disposition and reasoning, rather than 
subjective matters such as, perhaps, the degree to which the courts are 
ideologically aligned.  For studies that compare the Court and the circuits 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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the comparative degree to which the Supreme Court agrees with 
the circuit courts would, first, identify the overt action each court 
has taken (i.e., the issuance of a decision) and, then, consider the 
degree of apparent harmony (in reasoning and conclusions) 
between the Court’s decision and the circuit court’s decision.  
Only after this groundwork question has been answered might 
one seek to extrapolate more ephemeral, characterological 
qualities of ideological and attitudinal harmony by asking why 
the Court and circuit agree or disagree. 
On a case-by-case basis, determining objective “agreement” 
in cases the Supreme Court reviews seems relatively 
straightforward, although not entirely without complication.  If 
the Supreme Court reverses a decision of a circuit court of 
appeals, the Court presumably disagrees61 with the circuit in 
that particular case on that particular issue. 
The larger discussion, however, concerns whether the Court 
consistently agrees with particular circuits more often than with 
others.  In other words, is there is any statistically significant 
positive correlation between the circuit that rendered a decision 
and the likelihood that the Supreme Court will agree or disagree 
with the decision.  Assuming one can accurately determine 
“agreement” on a case-by-case basis, testing “agreement” in this 
larger sense requires a means of amassing and comparing 
significant numbers of Supreme Court and circuit court 
decisions.  To do so, it is reasonable to begin by examining the 
Court’s decisions (rather than the circuits’ decisions) because 
one will find nothing to compare unless the Court has spoken on 
an issue.  It might also seem reasonably convenient, then, to 
amass a population of cases for comparison by consulting 
publically available data regarding the disposition of those 
Supreme Court cases.  The following discussion elaborates why 
those publically reported case disposition data cannot, in fact, 
accurately capture the relative degree of agreement between the 
Court and the individual circuits with respect to cases the Court 
 
using objective measures, see infra notes 68-73. 
61. The Court might have agreed with the circuit court’s substantive 
analysis, but reversed for other reasons, such as standing or jurisdiction.  The 
Court might have disagreed with every aspect of the circuit court’s reasoning, 
but reached the same disposition for other reasons.  The circuit court might 
have agreed with the position the Supreme Court ultimately embraced, but 
been bound to follow contrary precedent prior to the Court’s ruling. 
21
  
498 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
has reviewed. 
Each of the data reporting resources noted earlier reports 
case disposition data.  SCOTUSBlog and Harvard Law Review 
publish raw disposition rates by Term, in the aggregate and for 
each circuit court of appeals (as well as for the specialized federal 
courts and state supreme courts).62 For cases from the circuits, 
these reporters derive these data by identifying the merits cases 
the Court has decided, determining the circuit to which the 
Court granted certiorari (i.e., the “circuit of origin”), determining 
whether the Court “affirmed,” “reversed”63 or “vacated” 64 the 
circuit of origin in each case, and reporting the total number of 
cases affirmed, reversed and vacated, both in the aggregate and 
disaggregated by circuit.  SCOTUSBlog also generates and 
reports simple affirm / reverse / vacate percentages (i.e., cases 
affirmed, reversed or vacated divided by cases decided), both in 
the aggregate and by circuit.65 
The Supreme Court Database reports unconsolidated 
individual case disposition data using eleven values66 that 
reflect the extent to which the Court agreed with the circuit of 
origin in that particular case on that particular issue.  Seven of 
these values essentially coincide with the three disposition 
values SCOTUS Blog and Harvard Law Review report.  These 
are: (i) affirmed (including modified), (ii) vacated, or vacated and 
 
62. See sources cited supra notes 14, 16. 
63. In the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, “reversed” includes cases reversed, 
reversed in part and affirmed in part, and reversed in part and vacated in part. 
2012 Term, supra note 14, at 418 n.n.  On SCOTUSBlog, “reversed” includes 
vacated. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14. 
64. In HARVARD LAW REVIEW, “vacated” includes cases vacated and 
vacated in part and affirmed in part.  2012 Term, supra note 14, at 418 n.o. 
65. See, e.g., Make-Up of the Merits Docket, supra note 39. These data are 
“simple” in the sense that the tools of statistical analysis, which might account 
for significance given the numbers of cases presented, have not been applied.  
Cf. supra note 14 and accompanying text.  In addition to reporting simple 
affirm / reverse percentages, both in the aggregate and disaggregated by 
circuit, SCOTUSBlog may provide “takeaway” commentary comparing 
individual circuits’ reversal rates. 
66. These values are: petition or motion granted, affirmed (includes 
modified), reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed 
and reversed (or vacated) in part, affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part 
and remanded, vacated, petition denied or appeal dismissed, certification to a 
lower court, no disposition). Disposition of Case, THE SUP. CT. DATABASE, 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation.php?var=caseDisposition 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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remanded, and (iii) four variables that other reporters generally 
code as reversed (reversed, reversed and remanded, affirmed 
and reversed (or vacated) in part, affirmed and reversed (or 
vacated) in part and remanded).67 The remaining four Supreme 
Court Database values relate primarily to cases decided other 
than by a full opinion on the merits. Although the Supreme 
Court Database does not summarize case disposition data by 
circuit or otherwise, it does code the circuit of origin for each 
case.68 Consequently, a researcher could readily generate 
comparative lists of case disposition data by circuit of origin data 
for selected time periods, issues or other variables. 
Scholars69 and other commentators70 routinely apply 
 
67. Id. 
68. Origin of Case, THE SUP. CT. DATABASE, 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation.php?var=caseOrigin (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
69. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 263 (considering Supreme 
Court circuit of origin only reversal rates); John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit’s 
Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive Theory of Judicial Obedience 
and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992) (exploring historical 
contentiousness between the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court); Roy W. McLeese, III, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship 
Between The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and its Implications for a 
National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1048, 1050-51 (1984) 
(assessing ideological relationship between the Supreme Court and District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals); Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths 
About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 358 (2006) [hereinafter Wermiel, 
Ninth Circuit] (examining Ninth Circuit reversal rates, considering circuit of 
origin only data; noting public perception that the Ninth Circuit “is a bastion 
of liberalism run amok”); Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reversals: 
Exploring the Seventh Circuit, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641 (2008) [hereinafter 
Wermiel, Seventh Circuit] (examining reversal rates and reputation, 
comparing the Seventh Circuit to the Ninth Circuit, relying on circuit of origin 
only reversal rates; noting that “[r]eversals are a hot topic”); see also sources 
cited infra notes 71-72. 
70. Jeff Bleich, The Reversed Court: The Supreme Court Versus the Ninth 
Circuit, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17, 17 (1997) (discussing Ninth Circuit review and 
reversal rates, relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates); David A. 
DeGroot, 9th Circuit Gets More Than its Fair Share of Scrutiny, DAILY J.  (June 
23, 2014) (arguing based on raw reversal rates that “the 9th Circuit is out-of-
sync with the high court and the other circuits”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder 
in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A15 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s 
performance based on circuit of origin only reversal rates in the Court’s 
October 2006 Term); Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE 8, 8 (2010) (comparing circuit court 
success rates based on circuit of origin only reversal data over ten years); Adam 
Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. TIMES, 
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publicly reported Supreme Court case disposition data to 
compare the circuits’ relative levels of agreement with the Court; 
ubiquitously conclude that the Court consistently reverses some 
circuits with much greater frequency than others;71 and 
 
June 30, 2002 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s performance based upon sources 
that rely on circuit of origin only reversal rates); Sean SeLegue, Perception Isn’t 
Reality: The Ninth Circuit’s Relationship With The U.S. Supreme Court, THE 
BAR ASS’N OF S.F., Spring 2011, at 32-34 (relying on circuit of origin only 
reversal rates to compare the Ninth Circuit to other circuits); Jonathan H. 
Adler, Is the Sixth Circuit the New Ninth (At Least in Habeas Cases)?, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/01/is-
the-sixth-circuit-the-new-ninth-at-least-in-habeas-cases/ (commenting on Dan 
Horn, U.S 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on 0-15 Losing Streak, CINCINNATI (Feb. 
21, 2011, 11:34 AM), 
http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110219/NEWS010702/102200325?nclick_
check=1 (stating that the Sixth Circuit “keeps getting it wrong”)); Judson 
Berger, Take a Hint? Supreme Court Rejects 5 Rulings in a Row From West 
Coast Bench, FOXNEWS (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/02/hint-supreme-court-rejects-
rulings-row-west-coast-bench/ (criticizing the Ninth Circuit based upon several 
then-recent circuit of origin only cases; suggesting that “[t]he Supreme Court 
may be sending a message to one of the country’s most liberal appeals courts”); 
Pierre Bergeron, U.S. Supreme Court Reversal Rates Continue to Attract 
Attention, SIXTH CIR. APP. BLOG (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/supreme-court/us-supreme-court-
reversal-rates-continue-to-attract-attention/ (commenting on Williams, infra 
note 70, discussing circuit of origin only reversal rates); Mark Walsh, A Sixth 
Sense: 6th Circuit Has Surpassed the 9th as the Most Reversed Appeals Court, 
A.B.A. J.  (Dec. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sixth_sense_6th_circuit_has_s
urpassed_the_9th_as_the_most_reversed_appeal/ (stating that the Sixth 
Circuit has “a particularly dismal record before the high court,” based 
primarily on circuit of origin only reversal rates for the Terms 2005 through 
2011, but also referring to the Hangley Study, see discussion infra Part IV.B); 
Carol J. Williams, US Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the US 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/ 2011/jul/18/local/la-me-ninth- circuit-scorecard-
20110718 (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates to criticize the Ninth 
Circuit’s success rates during the Court’s 2010 Term); see also sources cited 
infra notes 71-72. 
71. The Ninth Circuit is a singularly consistent, but by no means 
exclusive, target of criticism fueled by raw reversal rate statistics. See sources 
cited supra notes 69-70.  See, e.g., Hon. Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The 
Ninth Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit in the Country Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1465, 1471 (1997) (noting perception that “Ninth Circuit is reversed so 
often because it is the most liberal circuit in the country and because the 
Supreme Court is currently conservative”); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, 
Vacated and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 
OR. L. REV. 405 (1998) (considering possible reasons for the Ninth Circuit’s 
apparently high circuit of origin only reversal rate); McLeese, supra note 69, 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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frequently infer that ideological incompatibility between the 
Court and particular circuits drives reversal patterns.72 
 
at 1048, 1050-51 (noting “inordinate rate at which the Supreme Court grants 
D.C. Circuit certiorari petitions and reverses or vacates D.C. Circuit opinions” 
and arguing that “the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit are ideologically 
incompatible”); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2165 (2012) (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates; 
arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s record “has been strikingly poor”); Horn, supra 
note 70 (citing circuit of origin only reversal rates to conclude that the Sixth 
Circuit “keeps getting it wrong”); Steven Seidenberg, A Comeback for the 
Federal Circuit: This Term, SCOTUS Is No Longer the ‘Court of Correction,’ 
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/A_comeback_for_the_federal_cir
cuit_this_term_supreme_court_is_no_longer (relying on circuit of origin only 
reversal rates to compare the Federal Circuit’s record before the Supreme 
Court during the October 2010 Term to prior Terms); Robyn Hagan Cain, By 
the Numbers: Supreme Court Reversal and the Ninth Circuit, THE FINDLAW 9TH 
CIR. NEWS & INFO. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth_circuit/2011/09/by-the-numbers-supreme-
court-reversal-and-the-ninth-circuit.html (relying on circuit of origin only 
review and reversal rates to criticize the Ninth Circuit); Allen Pusey, Taking 
the Fifth to Task, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Blogpost in PRISONTALK: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE NEWS (July 24, 2004, 10:58 AM), 
http://prisontalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-70279.html (discussing the 
Fifth Circuit’s circuit of origin only reversal record during the Court’s 2003 
Term). 
72. See sources cited supra notes 69-71.  Some commentators have 
attempted to articulate other explanations for seeming patterns of high 
reversal rates for particular circuits, or criticized the practice of comparing 
circuits based upon reversal rates.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of 
the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2003) (considering circuit of 
origin reversal rates, numbers of cases reviewed, and anecdotal case 
examples); Farris, supra note 71 (attempting to rebut criticism of the Ninth 
Circuit’s origin only reversal rates); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and 
the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010) (examining Supreme Court review and reversal rates 
for the Federal Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit); Herald, supra note 
71 (examining Ninth Circuit decisions from a single Supreme Court term, 
including “indirect affirmances and reversals” in the case of circuit splits, but 
not considering circuit splits for other circuits); D.H. Kaye, Reflections on a 
Mathematical Argument for Splitting the Ninth Circuit, 48 JURIMETRICS. J. 329 
(2008) (considering the “mathematical” argument that the Ninth Circuit’s size 
underlies its high reversal rates); McLeese, supra note 69 (examining discord 
between the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit based on 
rates of review and reversal, relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates); 
Richard A. Posner, Is The Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of 
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 713, 715 (2000) (arguing that the 
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate is not due exclusively to its size); Kevin M. 
Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 354 
25
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Commentators also combine raw data showing apparent 
patterns of differences in reversal rates with raw data showing 
apparent patterns of differences in the numbers of petitions 
granted to each circuit to draw further inferences regarding the 
relative degree of harmony between the Court and the circuits.  
Common inferences include that the Court grants 
disproportionately greater numbers of certiorari petitions to 
specific circuits,73 grants certiorari primarily to reverse lower 
court decisions,74 and grants certiorari at least in part to 
discipline particularly errant circuits.75 
 
(2006) (relying on circuit of origin only reversal data to examine Ninth Circuit 
reversal rates; considering ideology and circuit size); Eric Hansford, Note, 
Measuring the Effects of Specialization With Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1145 (2011) (examining circuit splits during four Supreme Court terms 
to determine whether patterns exist with respect to circuit court success rates 
and regional judicial specialization); Cullen Seltzer, In Defense of the 9th 
Circuit: Why the Federal Appeals Court from the Left Coast Doesn’t Deserve its 
Bad Rap, SLATE (July 16, 2007, 4:09 PM),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/07/in_def
ense_of_the_9th_circuit.html. 
73. See, e.g., Bleich, supra note 70, at 17 (“For the fourth term in a row, 
the Ninth Circuit will have a disproportionate number of its decisions subject 
to discretionary review by the Supreme Court compared to other federal 
circuits.”); DeGroot, supra note 70 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s share of 
the Court’s docket is high compared to the Ninth Circuit’s share of the United 
States population); McLeese, supra note 69, at 1048 (noting apparently high 
rate of Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit); Fitzpatrick, supra note 70, 
at A15 (arguing that “[t]he justices spent much of their time reversing the U.S. 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals” during the Court’s October 2006 Term); 
Williams, supra note 70 (stating that Ninth Circuit cases “dominated the high 
Court’s docket, as usual” during the Court’s October 2010 Term). 
74. See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 70, at 8 (noting perception that “the 
Supreme Court only takes cases that it intends to reverse”); Kaye, supra note 
72, at 331 (“Inasmuch as the Court tends to grant review to cases that it finds 
problematic, it is likely to reverse regardless of the circuit in which the case 
originated.”); Daniel Solove, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Reversal 
Rate, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 25, 2007), 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/07/some_thoughts_o.html 
(concluding from SCOTUSBlog circuit of origin only reversal rates for the 2004 
through 2006 Terms that “the Supreme Court primarily takes cases it wants 
to reverse, with only a few exceptions”). 
75. See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 70, at 8 (noting perception that the Ninth 
Circuit is the “rogue circuit”); Posner, supra note 72, at 713, 715 (arguing that 
summary reversal “can fairly be described as a rebuke to the lower court”; 
attributing the District of Columbia Circuit’s high rate of non-summary 
reversals to its “dense menu of cases of national significance” and arguing that 
“the Ninth Circuit has no similar excuse for its high reversal rate”); Wermiel, 
Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 355 (noting that: “In its most persistent form, 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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The validity of all of these inferences, beginning with the 
basic presumption that a pattern of agreement between the 
Court and the circuits exists, hinges on whether simple Supreme 
Court case disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) reliably 
capture overtly expressed “agreement” between the Court and 
the circuits with respect to cases the Court has reviewed.  
Several fundamental hurdles, however, make Supreme Court 
case disposition data an unreliable measure of agreement 
between the Court and the circuits.  Among the most significant 
hurdles are that: (i) the Court reviews only a small number of 
the total decisions from each circuit (and those chosen for review 
depend upon both litigant and Court selection discretion);76 (ii) 
for every circuit of origin to which the Court grants certiorari in 
any particular case, there may be several other “sleeper 
circuits”77 that overtly expressed their opinions on the issue by 
contributing to a circuit split (or by issuing a decision in accord 
with the circuit of origin);78 (iii) the circuits might send 
significantly different types of issues to the Court for review;79 
(iv) the circuits’ marked differences in size and workload might 
affect the significance of presumed differences among the 
circuits;80 (v) changes in the Court’s composition over time might 
affect Supreme Court / circuit court agreement; (vi) “affirm” 
might mean that only five justices, rather than nine, agree with 
the circuit of origin;81 and (vii) the Court (or particular Justices) 
might agree with a lower court’s outcome while completely 
 
this perception holds that the Ninth Circuit is so out of control that the 
Supreme Court of the United States must devote considerable time and energy 
to reining in the judges and correcting their decisions”). 
76. See sources cited supra note 6. 
77. “Sleeper circuits” refers to the circuits that contributed to a circuit 
split, but were not chosen for certiorari. The term calls to mind a bowling ball 
toppling the visible pins, only to reveal the “sleepers” standing perfectly, 
mockingly, upright behind them.  The Hangley Study, discussed infra Part 
IV.B, refers to these as “shadow” circuits. 
78. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
79. See discussion infra at notes 83-92, and accompanying text. 
80. Although the implications of circuit size are beyond the scope of this 
Article, the application of statistical analysis tools can reveal the significance, 
if any, of raw differences in numbers and percentages.  Refer to the application 
of p scores throughout this Article. 
81. The implications of voting splits on the question of accord between the 
“Court” (as a presumed monolith) and the circuits are beyond the scope of this 
Article because they do not affect the hypotheses. 
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disagreeing with its reasoning.82 
This Article focuses on how sleeper circuits affect Supreme 
Court / circuit court accord assumptions because the sleeper 
circuit problem underlies, pervades and complicates each of the 
other hurdles that stand in the way of drawing inferences from 
simple case disposition data. For example, the data this Article 
presents concerning the problems created by circuit splits 
incidentally reveal important evidence regarding how issue 
disparity may affect Supreme Court / circuit court accord. That 
evidence and its implications are noted throughout as well. 
Part III.B elaborates the foundational challenges that 
circuit splits and sleeper circuits pose in measuring the level of 
accord between the Court and the circuits. 
 
B. Circuit Splits, Sleeper Circuits, and the Question of 
Agreement 
 
The Supreme Court typically reviews federal circuit court of 
appeals’ decisions on certiorari to resolve either a split among 
the lower federal courts,83 an important question of federal law, 
or a constitutional or quasi-constitutional question.84  When the 
circuits have split, some combination of serendipity (such as the 
order in which the circuits ruled before a split arose),85 
 
82. See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
83. Although the majority of such splits are among the courts of appeal, 
the Court does review cases in which the lower federal (district or bankruptcy) 
courts have split.  See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 
552, 557 (1990) (resolving split among lower federal courts regarding the 
Bankruptcy Code’s characterization of state law restitution obligations). 
84. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1254(1), 1331, 1334 (2006 & Supp. 2014); SUP. 
CT. R. 10 (identifying considerations in the granting of certiorari). Jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy matters is referred from the federal district courts to the 
federal bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006 & Supp. 2014). 
Bankruptcy matters typically begin in the federal bankruptcy courts, proceed 
by appeal to the federal district courts (or bankruptcy appellate panels, where 
constituted), and by appeal again to the federal courts of appeal. 
85. For example, in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court 
narrowly affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling, and thereby abrogated a prior 
Second Circuit ruling, on an important interaction between federal labor law 
and federal bankruptcy law. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 
(1984).  The Court previously had denied certiorari to the Second Circuit on 
the issue, despite the importance of the question.  See Bhd. of Ry. Airline & 
S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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circumstance (such as factual nuance),86 the parties’ decision 
whether to seek certiorari, and the Court’s own selection 
discretion will determine the circuit of origin.  Simple case 
disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) reflect, at best, the 
extent to which the Court agreed or disagreed with the circuit of 
origin on the issue presented.  The Court’s ruling, however, 
directly reflects the extent to which the Court agrees with both 
the circuit of origin and every sleeper circuit that has already 
ruled on the issue. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent bankruptcy law 
decision in Ransom v. FIA Card Services.87  The Court granted 
certiorari to the Ninth Circuit88 to resolve a circuit split over the 
interpretation of a Bankruptcy Code89 provision governing how 
to calculate the minimum payments an individual debtor must 
make to creditors under a chapter 13 plan.90  The Ninth Circuit 
had held that the debtor could deduct a car ownership allowance 
from his disposable income for purposes of this calculation only 
 
U.S. 1017 (1975).  Instead, the Court waited to grant certiorari until after the 
Third Circuit had ruled on the same issue and created a clear circuit split.  See 
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983), granting cert. to NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, 
supra note 69, at 361 (“The Supreme Court could just as easily have used the 
rulings of other circuits to reverse at another time, and it may be little more 
than a coincidence that a Ninth Circuit case was chosen.”). 
86. For example, in NCP Mtkg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., the Court 
denied certiorari to the Ninth Circuit in a case that involved the standards 
under which chapter 11 debtors-in-possession may assume executory 
contracts. N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 556 U.S. 1145 (2009). In 
an unusual action, Justice Kennedy issued a statement with respect to the 
denial of certiorari, which Justice Breyer joined.  Id.  The two justices noted 
that “[t]he division in the courts over the meaning [of the provision] is an 
important one to resolve” but  “[t]his petition for certiorari . . . is not the most 
suitable case for our resolution of the conflict” because the Court might be 
required to resolve antecedent questions of state law and trademark 
protection.  Id. Consequently, Justices Kennedy and Breyer “reluctantly agree 
with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari” but note that “[i]n a different case 
the Court should consider granting certiorari on this significant question.” Id. 
87. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011). 
88. In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009), cert granted, 562 
U.S. 61, 68 (2011) (“We granted a writ of certiorari to resolve a split of authority 
over whether a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments on his car 
may claim the deduction for vehicle-ownership costs.”). 
89. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006 & Supp. 2014) [hereinafter Bankruptcy 
Code]. 
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(2)(A)(i-ii) (2006 & Supp. 2014). 
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if the debtor was actually making loan or lease payments.91  
Three other circuits (the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits) 
disagreed.92 
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in an eight-to-one 
decision.93  The Ninth Circuit was correct (at least in the eyes of 
eight justices).94  The three sleeper circuits, which the Court 
implicitly abrogated,95 were incorrect (from that same 
perspective).  This follows because Ransom presented a true 
split, in which the circuits disagreed over how to apply a single 
legal rule to indistinguishable facts. In such a case, the Court’s 
ruling reveals its agreement or disagreement with the sleeper 
circuits just as surely as with the circuit of origin.  Simple 
Supreme Court case disposition data, however, reveals only that 
the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in this case, not that the 
Court disagreed with the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. 
The sleeper circuit problem arises whenever more than one 
circuit has ruled on an issue. Although this most commonly 
involves a circuit split, sleeper circuits can exist even in the 
absence of a circuit split if more than one circuit has ruled on the 
issue before the Court grants certiorari (in such a case, the Court 
may have granted certiorari to review a constitutional or other 
important question rather than to resolve a circuit split). 
A simple analogy demonstrates the inaccuracy of 
 
91. In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2009). 
92. See eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn (In re Washburn), 579 F.3d 
934 (8th Cir. 2009) (permitting the allowance without regard to whether the 
debtor was making payments); Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(permitting the allowance without regard to whether the debtor was making 
payments ); Ross-Tousey v. Neary (In re Ross-Tousey), 549 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 
2008) (permitting the allowance without regard to whether the debtor was 
making payments). 
93. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011).  Justice Scalia 
was the lone dissenter.  Id. at 80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94. Split decisions highlight the crudeness of measuring “agreement” 
between the Court and a circuit court without considering the votes of 
individual Justices.  As noted, the implications of non-unanimous decisions are 
beyond the scope of this Article because voting splits do not directly affect this 
Article’s hypotheses.  See supra note 81. 
95. When the underlying facts and holdings clearly allow, the reporting 
services may expressly note that the Court’s decision abrogates a sleeper 
circuit court of appeals decision.  See, e.g., Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Lamie 
v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
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considering only the circuit of origin when measuring Supreme 
Court/circuit court agreement.  Assume that I purchase nine 
items of school clothing for my daughter. I have interpreted the 
dress code (the law) to permit each of these items.  Moreover, 
rather than merely expressing my interpretation over tea at the 
local coffee shop, I have overtly acted upon and bound myself to 
this opinion by purchasing these items (as a circuit court overtly 
expresses its interpretation of the law by issuing a decision in a 
case).  The school (the Supreme Court) can directly review my 
decisions for compliance with the dress code if my daughter 
chooses to wear any of these items to school. 
Assume that, on the first day of school, my daughter 
actually wears three of the nine items to school—in effect, she 
has elected to seek direct review of my interpretive decisions.  
The school directly reviews my decisions, and decides that two 
items are in compliance with the dress code and one is not.  My 
record before the school (the Supreme Court) is now 67% in 
accord on direct review. 
Now, suppose that my other six overtly expressed purchase 
decisions are a sleeveless t-shirt, a pair of boots, patterned 
leggings, skinny jeans, short shorts, and wildly colored socks.  
Some other parents (other circuits) agree with me on some or all 
of these items (issues) and buy these items for their daughters.  
Others do not buy these items either because they interpret the 
dress code differently and affirmatively rule against buying 
these items (a “circuit split”), or because they have not 
considered how the dress code might apply to these items.96  
Because my daughter has not yet worn any of these items to 
school, the school has not directly ruled on my decisions with 
respect to these items.  Suppose, however, that other girls choose 
to attend school wearing sleeveless t-shirts, patterned leggings 
and short shorts (thereby exercising their own selection 
 
96. Parents of middle-school aged daughters will recognize this 
hypothetical as far from imaginary. 
This may be a less than pristine analogy because the school arguably would be 
able to review only the decisions that parents made in favor of an item being 
permitted by the dress code, i.e., items actually worn to school.  We may 
eliminate the imperfection by imagining a process under which a parent who 
determined that a particular item does not comply with the dress code may 
seek a ruling from the school even if no student has yet worn that item to 
school. 
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discretion and seeking direct review of their parents’ [circuits’] 
interpretive decisions).  If the school rules that each of these 
items violates the dress code, the school has overtly (although 
indirectly) abrogated my interpretive decisions regarding 
sleeveless t-shirts, patterned leggings, and short shorts.  Is my 
record of objectively measurable accord with the school still 67% 
(i.e., two out of three on direct review as “circuit of origin”) or is 
it 33% (i.e., two out of six, comprising two out of three on direct 
review plus zero out of three on indirect review as a “sleeper 
circuit”)? 
In this illustration, there is no objective way to measure 
whether the school and I agree on how the dress code applies to 
skinny jeans, boots or wildly colored socks because, although I 
have expressed my interpretation, the school has not.  With 
respect to the other six items, on which both the school and I 
have overtly expressed our interpretation, however, one can 
readily measure accord by considering both the items my 
daughter tested and the items other girls tested. Only the 
serendipity of the girls’ selections determined which parents’ 
identical interpretations of the dress code were subject to direct 
rather than indirect review. 
Simple Supreme Court case disposition data (affirm / 
reverse rates) do not reflect whether the Court agrees or 
disagrees with the sleeper circuits.97  Moreover, little weight can 
be attributed to the Court’s “choice” of circuit of origin because 
both litigant selection and the order in which the circuits have 
ruled profoundly limit the Court’s control over the circuit of 
origin when resolving a circuit split.98  If the Court functioned as 
a roving investigator, seeking out circuit splits, choosing which 
circuit’s decision to review, and consistently choosing the circuit 
that had erred (in the Court’s view), one might attribute an 
error-correcting function to the Court’s grant of certiorari and 
consequent designation of the circuit of origin.  Instead, 
 
97. Supreme Court Database, supra note 40 (recording whether the Court 
expressly accepted a case to resolve a circuit split, and identifying the circuit 
of origin, but not reporting any data regarding the circuits that contributed to 
the split). 
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  Even when the circuits 
have split, the Court may decline to grant certiorari if the circumstances in 
which the proffered case presents the issue are not felicitous.  See supra note 
78. 
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although the Court has some control over whether and when it 
reviews a circuit split, it can only choose from among the cases 
presented to it.  If Circuit P and Circuit Q split on an important 
question of federal law, but only the litigants in Circuit P choose 
to seek certiorari, Circuit Q has no chance of becoming the circuit 
of origin or of being counted as “affirmed” or “reversed.” 
Similarly, even if a litigant petitions for review, the Court may 
decline to grant certiorari until a circuit split arises.  Thus, if 
Circuit R decides an issue in 2005 and the Court denies review, 
Circuit S decides the same issue in conflict with Circuit R in 
2006 but the litigants do not seek Court review, and Circuit T 
decides the same issue in 2010, the circuit of origin when the 
Court finally reviews the issue may serendipitously be Circuit T. 
Litigant discretion also operates at the lower court levels.  For 
example, if lower courts in Circuit U are split on an issue but 
litigants in those cases do not seek circuit court review, Circuit 
U has no chance to decide the issue or to become a circuit of 
origin in Supreme Court review. 
Consequently, in order to use simple affirm / reverse rates 
to test hypotheses concerning the relative degree of overtly 
expressed accord between the Court and the circuits, a 
researcher must assume (or, prove) that affirm / reverse rates 
are an accurate stand-in (analogous to a random sample) for how 
frequently the Supreme Court overtly agrees with the circuit 
courts.  In other words, one must demonstrate that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the rate at which 
each circuit is affirmed or reversed when its decisions come 
before the Supreme Court directly as the circuit of origin (i.e., 
the affirm / reverse rate) and the rate at which each circuit is 
approved or abrogated when its decisions come before the 
Supreme Court overall, directly as a circuit of origin plus 
indirectly as sleeper circuit, combined (i.e., the approve / 
abrogate rate).99  To do this, one must (i) marshal circuit of origin 
affirm / reverse data and circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit 
approve / abrogate data, (ii) compare affirm / reverse data to 
approve / abrogate data, and (iii) interpret the implications of 
 
99. In the language of statistical analysis, the circuit of origin cases would 
need to constitute a random sample of the entire population of cases in which 
the circuit ruled on any issue that the Court ultimately addressed by certiorari 
either to that circuit or another circuit. 
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any differences, including by determining whether they are 
statistically significant.  Only if affirm / reverse rates mirror 
approve / abrogate rates (across time, issues, and perhaps other 
variables) can one use affirm / reverse rates to test the 
underlying hypothesis, i.e., whether there is a positive 
correlation between the circuit that rendered a decision and the 
likelihood that the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with 
the decision.100 
Commentators, however, typically draw inferences about 
Supreme Court / circuit court accord (or, more typically, discord) 
solely from Supreme Court case disposition data (generally, 
simple reversal rates), without acknowledging the challenges 
presented by the sleeper circuits.101  Several commentators have 
attempted to explain flawed or superficial analyses of reversal 
rate patterns by identifying factors that might explain these 
apparent patterns, such as circuit size or nature of the issues 
presented.102  These critiques are frequently inadequate, 
however, because they generally fail to account for the sleeper 
circuit problem, typically attempt to explain away apparent 
patterns rather than to demonstrate that apparent patterns 
might evaporate if sleeper circuits were considered, and tend to 
rely upon anecdotal evidence with scant supporting data, at 
best.103 
 
100. Null Hypothesis H0: the circuit that rendered a decision has no effect 
on whether the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with the decision.  
Alternative Hypothesis Ha: the circuit that rendered a decision does affect 
whether the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with the decision. 
101. See sources cited supra notes 63-67. 
102. See sources cited supra notes 69, 98. 
103. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 72 (considering circuit of origin 
reversal rates, numbers of cases reviewed, and anecdotal case examples); 
Farris, supra note 71 (acknowledging the Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate 
based on circuit of origin only data, but arguing that the circuit’s reversal rate 
is low as a function of the number of cases the Ninth Circuit decides and is not 
surprising given the importance of the issues the circuit decides); Seidenberg, 
supra note 71 (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates to compare the 
Federal Circuit’s record before the Supreme Court during the October 2010 
Term to prior Terms); SeLegue, supra note 70, at 32-34 (relying on circuit of 
origin only reversal rates to compare the Ninth Circuit to other circuits); 
Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 358 (acknowledging that “anecdotal 
evidence is all that this Essay has to offer,” and arguing that “quantitative 
questions are only a starting point and must be combined with qualitative 
analysis to shed any real light on” the Ninth Circuit’s “liberals run amok” 
reputation). 
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Recently, a few commentators have attempted to articulate 
problems inherent in drawing inferences from Supreme Court 
disposition rates without considering the implications of circuit 
splits and sleeper circuits.  This recognition is an extremely 
important first step. In general, however, even these discussions 
fail to mount an empirical response to the problem raised by 
circuit splits because they tend to rely upon anecdote and 
theoretical argument rather than data.104 One recent study, 
explored and applied infra in Parts IV and V, does bring data to 
the question; however, it reports variations between affirm / 
reverse data and approve / abrogate data only in raw 
percentages without the tools necessary to determine the 
significance of any differences it reveals. 
This Article presents the first Study that directly compares 
affirm / reverse rates and approve / abrogate rates and 
demonstrates the statistical significance of differences between 
these data.  It does so using two separate datasets that directly 
test the basic inquiry: i.e., whether there is any significant 
difference between the circuit courts’ affirm / reverse rates (as 
circuit of origin) and approve / abrogate rates (as circuit of origin 
plus sleeper circuit).105  Part IV describes the datasets and the 
methods the Study applies to this inquiry. 
 
 
104. See Hansford, supra note 72 (considering circuit splits in the context 
of specialized judicial decision making); Herald, supra note 71, at 414-17 
(including “indirect affirmances and reversals” arising from circuit splits to 
bolster the Ninth Circuit’s apparent approval rates for the Court’s 1996 Term); 
Stephen L. Wasby, How the Ninth Circuit Fares in the Supreme Court: The 
Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 119 (2005) (considering 
circuit splits involving the Ninth Circuit); Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note 
69 (acknowledging the unfairness of counting only the circuit of origin but 
nevertheless considering only circuit of origin reversal rates); John Summers 
et al., Supreme Court Project, HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER, 
http://www.hangley.com/Supreme_Court_Project/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2015) 
[hereinafter Hangley Study] (including circuit split data for seven years of 
Roberts Court decisions); see also Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy 
Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173 (2000) (considering circuits of origin and sleeper 
circuits in a different context). 
105. Null Hypothesis H0: there is no significant difference between any 
circuit court’s reversal rate (as circuit of origin) and its abrogation rate (as 
circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit). Alternative Hypothesis Ha: there is a 
significant difference between at least some circuit courts’ reversal rates (as 
circuit of origin) and abrogation rates (as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit). 
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IV. The Data and The Study 
 
A. Parameters, Data, Methods and Objectives 
 
This Article does not purport to draw conclusions regarding, 
nor to explain the bases for any differences in, the “true” level of 
agreement between the Court and the respective courts of 
appeal.106  Definitive answers to that question require deeper 
analysis of the factors identified in Part III. Rather, this Article 
begins the exploration by analyzing the most fundamental 
aspect of this relationship that is absent from much popular 
discussion, i.e.: (i) whether taking sleeper circuits into account 
reveals differences between reversal rates and abrogation rates; 
(ii) if so, whether those differences are significant; and (iii) if so, 
how those differences affect the validity of assessing accord 
between the circuits and the Supreme Court based solely upon 
Supreme Court case disposition data.  In the course of this 
analysis, this Article also highlights important questions that 
the data incidentally reveal regarding how issue disparity may 
affect presumed rates of accord.  Evidence concerning the 
potential implications of issue disparity arises specifically in the 
context of comparing overall data to single-subject habeas 
corpus data and single-subject bankruptcy data. 
This Article examines these questions using two distinct 
datasets.  The first compares affirm / reverse rates and approve 
/ abrogate rates for all issues over a seven-year period of the 
Roberts Court (as described in Part IV.B).  The second compares 
affirm / reverse and approve / abrogate rates during the entirety 
of the Court’s jurisprudence in one subject area, namely thirty-
two years of Bankruptcy Code decisions (as described in Part 
IV.C).  Applying two distinctive datasets counter-balances the 
benefits and limits of shorter-term overall data and longer-term 
single-subject data, and introduces the implications of issue 
disparity.  The Study examines each dataset independently, and 
 
106. See sources cited supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text 
(discerning accord between the Court and the circuits would require, at a 
minimum, accounting for the effects of critical variables such as circuit size, 
issue disparity, individual Justices’ votes, and changes in composition of the 
Court, as well as circuit splits).  The question of issue disparity is explored 
infra at text accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14. 
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where appropriate, trims data to create comparable parallels.  
Where useful, the Study highlights the potential impact of issue 
disparity by comparing single-subject bankruptcy data to single-
subject habeas corpus data drawn from these datasets. 
 
B. Dataset I: All Issues, Roberts Court, Seven Terms 
 
1.  Scope of the Data 
 
A recent study reports summary reversal rates and 
abrogation rates for the Roberts Court’s 2005 through 2011 
Terms (“Hangley Study”).107  The Hangley Study’s most 
important contribution lies in the fact that it endeavors to 
include the sleeper circuit (therein referred to as “shadow 
circuit”) decisions underlying each of the Court’s decisions and 
to compare circuit-by-circuit success rates based upon 
abrogation data (therein referred to as “full reversal rates”) as 
well as reversal data. 
 
2.  Methods, Coding and Selection Determinations 
 
The Hangley Study identifies sleeper circuits at a primary 
level of depth by counting a sleeper circuit decision only if the 
Court’s majority opinion states that it is resolving a circuit 
split.108 
The Hangley Study reports its comparisons of reversal rates 
and abrogation rates using only raw totals and percentages, 
without statistical analysis that might determine whether any 
perceived differences are significant or the result of random 
chance.  To analyze these data, the Study this Article reports, 
translates the Hangley Study data into a format that makes 
determinations of probability and significance feasible.  It does 
not independently reevaluate the validity of the Hangley Study 
 
107. Hangley Study, supra note 104. 
108. Id.; accord Hansford, supra note 72, at 1161-62 (limiting inquiry to 
cases in which the Court expressly states that it is resolving a circuit split); cf. 
infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the method used to identify 
sleeper circuits in the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, infra note 
116). 
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data.109  For example, if the Hangley Study raw data identifies a 
category comprising twenty cases, of which nine were reversed 
and eleven were affirmed, this Study establishes a data file 
(STATA or Excel) showing twenty separate observations and 
assigning a value of “affirm” to eleven and “reverse” to nine.  
This enables statistical analysis of the data to determine 
whether any apparent differences among datasets are 
significant or the result of random chance. This Article refers to 
these translated data files as the Roberts Court Dataset.110 
 
3.  The Habeas Corpus Data 
 
Where useful to highlight potential complications arising 
from the disparity of issues the Court has reviewed from 
individual circuit courts, this Article considers habeas corpus 
data drawn from the Hangley Study. The Hangley Study derives 
habeas corpus data on the same basis as overall data, and the 
Study this Article reports translates the Hangley Study habeas 
corpus data into the Roberts Court Dataset format on the same 
basis as other Hangley Study data (Part IV.B.1-2). 
 
C. Dataset II: Single Subject, Bankruptcy Code, Thirty-Two 
Terms 
 
1.  Scope of the Data 
 
Congress enacted the modern Bankruptcy Code111 in 
1978.112 The first cases testing the law came before the Court in 
 
109. Specifically, this Article does not reevaluate whether the Hangley 
Study accurately and fully captures every sleeper (or shadow) circuit, or 
accurately codes case disposition values (affirm, reverse, etc). 
110. The Roberts Court Dataset is available upon request from the author. 
Unless otherwise noted, ratios, deviations and measures of statistical 
significance and correlation reported throughout this Study have been 
calculated to at least the sixth decimal place before being rounded. 
111. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 89. 
112. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became effective on 
October 1, 1979.  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. 
(2nd Sess. 1978).  It has been amended from time to time, most significantly 
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, H.R. 
5174, 98th Cong. (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and 
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the 1981 Term.113 In the ensuing thirty-two Terms, the Supreme 
Court has considered seventy-four Bankruptcy Code cases.  
Underlying these cases are 248 circuit of origin and sleeper 
circuit decisions.114 The Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court 
Database 115 compiles data regarding each bankruptcy decision 
the Supreme Court has rendered since the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and each underlying court of appeals decision, 
including both circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decisions.116 
 
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, H.R. 5316, 99th Cong. (1986); 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103rd Cong. (2nd Sess. 1994); and 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256, 
109th Cong. (2005). The Bankruptcy Code superseded the former Bankruptcy 
Act.  See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1898), as amended by 
Chandler Act of 1938 H.R. 8046, 75th Cong. (1st Sess. 1937) (repealed 1979) 
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Act] . 
113. See Cent. Tr. Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm., 454 U.S. 354 (1982); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
After the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court issued opinions in three 
cases decided under the former Bankruptcy Act.  See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n 
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); 
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).  This Article, and the Bankruptcy 
Code Supreme Court Database, infra note 116, exclude the Bankruptcy Act 
cases. 
114. See infra note 116. 
Many of the tables and calculations throughout this Article refer to seventy-
six Supreme Court bankruptcy case observations, rather than seventy-three. 
This discrepancy arises from two sources.  First, because most aspects of this 
Article compare the circuits’ relative performance, these analyses include only 
the seventy-three cases that came to the Supreme Court from the circuits. The 
seventy-fourth case was certified to the Supreme Court directly from a district 
court because it raised important constitutional questions.  See N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (affirming the 
federal district court holding that grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the 
bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional). Second, of the seventy-three 
remaining cases, three presented two distinct issues on which either the 
Supreme Court issued distinctly different holdings, or different sleeper circuits 
had rendered underlying decisions.  Each of these cases is treated as two 
observations, rather than one, which increases the number of distinct 
observations from seventy-three to seventy-six.  See infra note 121 (identifying 
the three cases that merit this treatment). This treatment increases the 
number of underlying circuit court decisions from 248 to 251. 
115. All datasets and database access are available upon request from the 
author.  See supra note 110. 
116. Bankruptcy case observations specific to this Article are reported in 
discrete text files within the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, as 
follows: Appendix I: Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Decisions, By Term, 
1981-2012, lists each Supreme Court bankruptcy case, by Term; Appendix II: 
Circuit Court of Appeals Bankruptcy Code Decisions, by Supreme Court 
39
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For simplicity, this Article refers to the aspects of the 
Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database relevant to the 
question of Supreme Court / circuit court accord as the 
Bankruptcy Dataset. 
Bankruptcy law provides a useful single-topic comparative 
study for several reasons. First, examining a single area of law 
reduces the potential for aggregating areas of law that might 
foster greater ideological discord together with those that may 
not.117 Although there are varied issues even within a single area 
of law, focusing on one area of law allows one to compare apples 
to apples, at least, if not necessarily HoneycrispTM to 
HoneycrispTM.118 Second, bankruptcy law presents a case study 
large enough to be meaningful, yet discreet enough to be 
 
Decisions, Alphabetical, 1981-2012, lists each of the seventy-four Supreme 
Court bankruptcy cases decided during the 1981-2012 Terms, in alphabetical 
order, together with each of the 248 circuit court decisions that found their way 
to the Court, either directly as circuit of origin or indirectly as a sleeper circuit 
behind a circuit split in those seventy-four cases; Appendix III: Circuit Court 
of Appeals Bankruptcy Code Decisions, by Circuit, 1981-2012, organizes the 
information contained in Appendix II on a circuit-by-circuit basis. 
This Article, and the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, omit 
decisions that incidentally arose from bankruptcy cases but involved no 
bankruptcy related issues, namely United States v. Galetti, 541 U.S. 114 (2004) 
(considering applicability of statute of limitations in tax matter regarding 
partners and partnership), and Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470 (1998) 
(clarifying the removal issues raised in Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 
U.S. 394 (1981)), and cases in which the Court simply vacated and remanded 
or dismissed as moot a Bankruptcy Code decision, namely Christians v. Crystal 
Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating and remanding for 
reconsideration in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)), and 
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (denying 
vacatur and dismissing appeal as moot). 
The Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database also compiles additional 
variables not relevant to this Study, including each Justice’s individual votes, 
party affiliation of each Justice’s appointing president, the specific issues 
presented, vote splits, and methods of statutory interpretation applied. 
117. Even in areas of the law that are evolving or likely to cause 
ideological divide, the Court rarely reverses itself absent the passage of 
significant time, social change, change in the composition of the Court, or a 
combination of these factors.  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896)). 
118. The reasons HoneycrispTM varietal apples are so scrumptious are 
considered in John Seabrook, Crunch: Building a Better Apple, THE NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/21/crunch. 
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manageable. The number of bankruptcy cases from each circuit 
during this period is also sufficiently balanced to permit 
comparison. Third, because bankruptcy cases frequently, but by 
no means always, come to the Court due to circuit splits, 
bankruptcy law presents a viable opportunity to compare 
reversal rates to abrogation rates in a single area of law.119 
 
2.  Methods, Coding and Selection Determinations 
 
Three significant data selection and coding decisions 
affecting the Bankruptcy Dataset are worth mention. Each of 
these decisions is driven by the nature of the inquiry, i.e., the 
question of accord between the Court and the circuits. 
First, the Bankruptcy Dataset includes a circuit as a sleeper 
circuit if any of the following refer to the sleeper circuit’s 
underlying decision: the Court’s majority opinion, the Court’s 
separate opinions, or the opinions in the circuit of origin case to 
which the Court granted certiorari.120 Second, if a case involves 
two distinct issues on which the Court treats the underlying 
circuits differently, this Study reports the case as two 
observations rather than one, for all purposes.121 (If a circuit has 
issued more than one decision on the same issue, the circuit’s 
position is counted only once.) Finally, the Study codes the 
Court’s treatment of the circuit court decision as “agree” or 
 
119. Of the seventy-four Bankruptcy Code cases the Court considered 
during the 1981 through 2012 Terms, fifty-two cases (70%) involved circuit 
splits. See Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix II, supra note 
116. 
120. The Supreme Court does not always expressly state that it is 
resolving a circuit split, nor does it always identify the cases involved in the 
split. To balance replicability and accuracy, this Article and Bankruptcy Code 
Supreme Court Database identify as sleeper circuits both (i) the underlying 
circuit court decisions the Supreme Court expressly mentions, and (ii) 
additional underlying circuit court decisions that the circuit of origin decisions 
mention.  Cf. Hangley Study, supra note 104 (limiting inquiry to cases in which 
the Court expressly states that it is resolving a circuit split); Hansford, supra 
note 72, at 1161-62 (examining circuit splits during four Supreme Court terms 
to determine whether patterns exist with respect to circuit court success rates 
and regional judicial specialization). 
121. The three cases that merit this treatment are Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010), United States v. Reorganized 
CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996), and Bd. of Governors v. 
MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991). 
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“disagree.”  Consequently, if the Court affirms a circuit court’s 
result while clearly and expressly rejecting its holding and 
reasoning, the case is coded as “disagree” with respect to that 
circuit.122 
As more fully elaborated in Part V, to the extent that direct 
comparisons between overall data and bankruptcy data are 
appropriate, this Article specifies whether it compares the 
entirety of the Roberts Court Dataset and Bankruptcy Dataset, 
or trims those data to create matching parallels. Where trimmed 
data is useful, the analysis trims the Roberts Court data to cover 
only the twelve circuits in which bankruptcy cases could arise 
(i.e., it excludes data from state courts and the Federal Circuit), 
and trims the bankruptcy data to cover only the 2005 through 
2011 Terms (i.e., the period to which the Roberts Court data 
applies).123 
 
V. Findings: Differences Between Reversal Rates and 
Abrogation Rates 
 
A. Overview of Findings 
 
This Article concludes that: (i) there are measurable 
differences between affirm / reverse rates as compared to 
approve / abrogate rates on both an aggregate and circuit-by-
circuit basis, in both the Roberts Court Dataset and the 
Bankruptcy Dataset; (ii) some of the differences are statistically 
significant, others are not; and (iii) the observed differences are 
 
122. In order to balance replicability with validity, this exception is 
applied only where the difference between “affirm / reverse” and “agree / 
disagree” is express and virtually indisputable. The one case that merits this 
treatment is United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome reached by the Tenth Circuit but 
expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning and holding on both issues 
presented. The Tenth Circuit had held that Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2) was 
intended to apply retroactively, and consequently violated the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Rodrock v. Sec. Indus. 
Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1976 Supp. 
V); U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Supreme Court affirmed the result, reasoning 
that § 522(f)(2) was not intended to apply retroactively and did not violate the 
United States Constitution. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 
(1982). 
123. See discussion infra Part V, at Table II and accompanying text. 
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significant enough to demonstrate that one cannot employ 
simple affirm / reverse rates to draw reliable inferences 
regarding Supreme Court agreement with the circuit courts of 
appeal, either in the aggregate or on a circuit-by-circuit 
comparative basis. 
Nevertheless, this Article does not suggest that a researcher 
could draw definitive conclusions regarding agreement between 
the Court and the individual circuits merely by replacing affirm 
/ reverse rates (which do not account for sleeper circuits) with 
approve / abrogate rates (which do). One cannot draw reliable 
inferences without controlling for other critical variables. These 
include, most notably, the effect that issue disparity, circuit size, 
and circuit workload may have on apparent levels of accord 
between the Court and the respective circuit courts. Although 
this Article does not directly analyze these factors, it does reveal 
sufficient evidence to suggest the fundamental importance of 
issue disparity. This evidence includes marked differences 
between abrogation rates for all issues, bankruptcy issues, and 
habeas corpus issues, as well as differences in the magnitude of 
divergence between affirm / reverse and approve / abrogate 
results in the overall dataset as compared to the single-subject 
datasets. This evidence is detailed where relevant throughout 
the analysis to caution against overly simplistic application of 
this Study’s findings and to define the parameters of questions 
meriting further study, particularly with respect to issue 
disparity.124 
Select findings that support these conclusions, within the 
specific parameters of the Study, include the following: 
 
(1) On an aggregate (all circuit) basis: 
 
(a) Roberts Court Dataset overall abrogation 
rates are significantly lower than overall reversal 
rates; in other words, the Court disagrees with the 
circuits far less than simple reversal rates would 
suggest;125 
 
 
124. See discussion infra text accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13, 14. 
125. See infra Table II and accompanying text. 
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(b) Bankruptcy Dataset abrogation rates are 
not significantly different than bankruptcy 
reversal rates;126 habeas corpus abrogation rates 
are not significantly different than habeas corpus 
reversal rates; in other words, examining the 
Supreme Court / circuit court relationship on an 
topic-by-topic basis reveals different patterns of 
accord than consolidated-issue analysis suggests; 
 
(c) bankruptcy abrogation rates mirror 
overall abrogation rates;127 habeas corpus 
abrogation rates are significantly higher than 
overall abrogation rates; in other words, the 
nature of the issue presented may significantly 
affect the degree to which the Court agrees with 
the circuit courts. 
 
(2) On a disaggregated by circuit basis, abrogation 
rates reveal less variation among the circuits and less 
divergence between the Court and individual circuits 
than reversal rates alone would suggest. Specifically: 
 
(a) in the Roberts Court Dataset, eleven 
circuits’ individual abrogation rates are closer to 
the fiftieth percentile than are their respective 
reversal rates;128 only three circuits’ abrogation 
rates deviate from the mean to a degree that has 
strong statistical significance; and only one 
deviates to a degree that has mild statistical 
significance;129 
 
(b) in the Bankruptcy Dataset, eight circuits’ 
individual abrogation rates are closer to the 
fiftieth percentile than are their respective 
 
126. See infra Table I, Table II and accompanying text. 
127. See supra note 126. 
128. See infra Table III and accompanying text. 
129. See supra note 128. 
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reversal rates;130 none deviate from the mean to a 
degree that has strong statistical significance131; 
and only one deviates to a degree that has mild 
statistical significance.132 
 
Part V.B details aggregate finding and conclusions. Part 
V.C details disaggregated by circuit findings and conclusions. 
 
B. Differences Between Reversal Rates and Abrogation Rates: 
Aggregate Findings 
 
Part B compares simple circuit of origin only Supreme Court 
case disposition rates (affirm / reverse) to overall circuit of origin 
plus sleeper circuit rates (approve / abrogate) on an aggregate 
(all circuit) basis. 
 
1.  Employing Statistical Analysis to Measure Significance: 
Roberts Court Dataset, Aggregate Findings 
 
The Hangley Study reports simple percentage reversal and 
abrogation rates for all Roberts Court merits cases during the 
2005 through 2011 Terms.133  These data reveal an aggregate 
reversal rate of approximately 72%, compared to an aggregate 
abrogation rate of approximately 57%.134  Figure 1 and Figure 2 
illustrate these findings. 
 
 
130. See infra Table IV and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 130. 
132. See supra note 130. 
133. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibit I. 
134. See infra Figures 1, 2; see also Roberts Court Dataset, supra note 110 
and accompanying text. 
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Figure 1, Data Source: Hangley Study Exhibit 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, Data Source: Hangley Study Exhibit 1 
 
 The Study this Article reports creates the Roberts Court 
Dataset to convert the Hangley Study affirm / reverse data and 
approve / abrogate data from summary format to individual 
observations.  It then applies statistical analysis tools to 
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determine the probability that the observed differences 
between these rates are significant, that is, whether these 
differences are random or meaningful.  That analysis reveals 
that the difference between aggregate reversal rates and 
aggregate abrogation rates in the Roberts Court Dataset is 
highly significant.135  In other words, simple case disposition 
data (affirm / reverse rates) do not accurately reflect the degree 
to which the Court overtly agrees with the courts of appeal, on 
an aggregate basis.  Further analysis in the balance of this 
Article reinforces this conclusion.  For reasons discussed below 
in the context of issue disparity, however, the mere fact that 
the aggregate reversal rate exceeds the aggregate abrogation 
rate cannot support a blanket inference that the Court grants 
certiorari primarily to reverse the lower court (i.e., as an error-
correcting mechanism).136 
 
2.  Significance: Bankruptcy Dataset, Aggregate Findings 
 
 For bankruptcy cases, the Study examines the entirety of 
the Supreme Court’s thirty-two year Bankruptcy Code 
jurisprudence through the 2012 Term.  Table I compares affirm 
/ reverse rates to approve / abrogate rates in bankruptcy cases. 
Column 1 reports the aggregate number of bankruptcy cases 
in which the Court granted certiorari.137  Column 2 reports the 
 
135. p < 0.0001. Statistical analyses “p” values report the results of 
classical tests of hypotheses, two-variable means comparison analyses (i.e., “t-
Test”), unless otherwise noted.  A t-Test result of p<0.01 is reported as “highly” 
or “strongly” significant (i.e., 99th or greater confidence interval in the 
probability that the result is significant); p<0.05 is reported as “significant” 
(i.e., 95th confidence interval); p>0.05 but <0.1 is reported as “mildly” 
significant (i.e., 90th confidence interval). 
136. See, e.g., discussion supra note 120 and accompanying text; infra text 
accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13, 14. 
See generally, Kastellec & Lax, supra note 6, at 408 (considering whether the 
Supreme Court selects cases for certiorari in order to reverse and correct 
errors); Mak, supra note 6, at 54-55 (“[T]he certiorari stage at the Supreme 
Court . . . goes beyond simple error correction of the lower courts. Deciding 
which cases to decide serves as an opportunity for the justices to pursue their 
policy preferences.”); cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is 
rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings 
or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”). 
137. These data derive from Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, 
Appendix I, supra note 116. 
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number of those cases in which the Court affirmed / reversed 
each circuit, and the simple affirm / reverse rate.  Column 3 
reports the aggregate number of bankruptcy cases that the 
Court reviewed overall as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit. 
Column 4 reports the number of those cases in which the Court 
approved / abrogated the circuits’ positions, and the aggregate 
approve / abrogate rate.138  To establish a parallel comparison 
with overall data from the Roberts Court Dataset, for reasons to 
be discussed shortly, Table I also reports a trimmed portion of 
the bankruptcy data covering only the 2005 through 2011 
Terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I 
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate 
All Circuit Aggregate 
 
Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases: 1981-2012 Terms 
Roberts Court Bankruptcy Code Cases: 2005 – 2011 Terms 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
 Number of 
observations 
Circuit of 
origin only 
 
Affirm–
Reverse 
Number 
Percent 
Circuit of 
origin only 
Number of 
observations 
Origin & 
Sleeper 
circuits 
Approve–
Abrogate 
Number 
Percent 
Origin & Sleeper 
circuits 
1981-
2012 
Terms 
76 
 
39–37 
51.32–48.68 
% 
251 
 
108–143 
43.03–56.97 % 
 
2005-
2011 
Terms 
15 8—7 
53.3–46.7% 
43 22–21 
51.2–48.8% 
 
138. These data derive from Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, 
Appendix II, supra note 116. 
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Source: Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT 
Reversals WinLoss Overview *139 
 
During the period studied, there were seventy-six circuit of 
origin case observations compared to 251 circuit of origin plus 
sleeper circuit case observations.  Aggregate reversal and 
abrogation rates hovering near 50% are the norm.  The 
aggregate abrogation rate is approximately 57% in bankruptcy 
cases.140  The aggregate reversal rate is approximately 49% in 
bankruptcy cases.141 Statistically, these differences are not 
significant, given the numbers of cases presented.142  Figure 3 
and Figure 4 illustrate these aggregate bankruptcy case 
findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, Source: Table I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139. See supra notes 116, 127; infra text accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13, 
14. 
140. See supra Table I, Column 4. 
141. See supra Table I, Column 2. 
142. See supra Table I (p = 0.2044). 
51.3%48.7%
Supreme	  Court	  Affirm	  /	  Reverse	  
Bankruptcy	  Cases	  1981	  -­‐ 2012
43%57%
Supreme	  Court	  Approve	  /	  Abrogate	  
Bankruptcy	  Cases	  1981	  -­‐ 2012
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Figure 4, Source: Table I 
 
The insignificance of the differences between aggregate 
reversal rates and abrogation rates in bankruptcy cases sheds 
little direct light on the application of reversal data to the 
question of Supreme Court / circuit court agreement.  Part V.C 
considers the extent to which disaggregated by circuit data 
provide greater insight.143 
 
3.   Implications of Issue Disparity: Aggregate Evidence 
 
Before examining disaggregated data, however, consider 
the differences between the Roberts Court Dataset overall 
aggregate results, the Bankruptcy Dataset single-topic results, 
and habeas corpus single-topic results.  The contrast between 
overall and single-issue results suggests that issue disparity 
may affect apparent rates of accord between the Court and the 
circuit courts.  Although a thorough analysis of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this Study, the evidence this Study does 
reveal warrants an important detour.  This detour identifies 
concerns that require deeper analysis regarding how issue 
disparity affects apparent rates of accord, and cautions against 
drawing inferences from these data without engaging in that 
deeper analysis. 
First, according to the data reported in Part V.B.1, the 
Roberts Court has reversed the (significant) majority of all 
decisions on which it has granted certiorari.  In other words, the 
 
143. See infra Part V.C (disaggregating and analyzing reversal and 
abrogation rates by circuit). 
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grant of certiorari seemingly is more likely than not to result in 
the Court reversing the circuit of origin, in all cases decided by 
the Roberts Court between 2005 and 2011.144  This might tempt 
one to conclude that the Court grants certiorari primarily to 
reverse the lower court, i.e., as an error-correcting mechanism.  
This assumption is invalid, however, as applied to bankruptcy 
cases.  The grant of certiorari is slightly more likely than not to 
result in the Court affirming the circuit of origin, in bankruptcy 
cases.145  Because the difference is not statistically significant, 
the relationship between the grant of certiorari and whether the 
Court affirms or reverses appears to be profoundly neutral in 
bankruptcy cases.146  In contrast, the grant of certiorari in 
habeas corpus cases is significantly more likely than not to 
result in reversal, as discussed following Figure 5.147 
Second, although overall reversal rates are significantly 
higher than bankruptcy reversal rates, overall abrogation rates 
are virtually identical to bankruptcy abrogation rates.  The 
Roberts Court Datasets (all issues during a seven-year period) 
shows a significantly higher rate148 of reversal (approximately 
72%) than of abrogation (approximately 57%).149 In contrast, the 
Bankruptcy Dataset (bankruptcy cases during a thirty-two year 
period) shows no significant difference150 between the aggregate 
reversal rate (approximately 49%) and aggregate abrogation 
rate (approximately 57%).151  And yet, the aggregate, overall, 
 
144. See supra Figures 1, 2 (showing reversal rate of 71.6%, abrogation 
rate of 56.6%). 
145. See infra Table II; supra Figures 3, 4 (showing reversal rate of 
48.68%, abrogation rate of 56.97%). 
146. See supra Table I (p= 0.2044) (comparing the relationship between 
aggregate reversal rates and aggregate abrogation rates in bankruptcy cases, 
1981 to 2012). 
147. Habeas corpus reversal rates (approximately 87%) are not 
significantly different than habeas corpus abrogation rates (approximately 
78%), see infra Table II (p=0.1743), but both significantly exceed overall 
abrogation rates (approximately 57%). 
148. See infra Table II (p < 0.0001). 
149. See supra 110 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 116, Figures 3, 4; see infra Table II. 
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Roberts Court abrogation rate of 57%,152 is virtually identical to 
the aggregate, bankruptcy-only abrogation rate of 57%.153 
Third, these patterns remain if one controls for both the 
different time periods these datasets cover154 and the different 
 
152. See supra Figure 4 (56.6%). 
153. See supra Figure 2 (56.7%). 
154. Bankruptcy Code cases do not arise in the Federal Circuit or state 
supreme courts.  Therefore, the Roberts Court data is trimmed to cases arising 
in the eleven numbered circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit, in order 
to match the bankruptcy data.  The bankruptcy data covers thirty-two Terms 
(1981 through 2012), whereas the Roberts Court data covers seven Terms 
(2005 through 2011).  Therefore the bankruptcy data is trimmed to cases 
arising during the 2005 through 2011 Terms, in order to match the Roberts 
Court data. 
Both overall reversal rates and bankruptcy reversal and abrogation rates have 
remained fairly stable during the period 1981 through 2012.  The overall 
reversal rate the Hangley Study reports for the Roberts Court (71%) is 
consistent with overall reversal rates over several decades.  Hangley Study, 
supra note 104, at Exhibit I.  During the period reported by SCOTUSBlog, 
supra note 14, for example (namely, the Supreme Court’s 1995 through 2012 
Terms), the Court reversed the circuit of origin in 67% of all cases combined.  
See Tom Goldstein, Stat Pak Archive, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2015) 
(showing a total of 1,299 cases and 875 reversals between 1995 and 2012).  This 
Study does not independently re-calculate the annual statistics reported by 
Mr. Goldstein.  Rather, it employs his annual reports to calculate aggregate 
sixteen-year simple reversal ratios.  Id.  When data from HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW’S summaries of the 1981 through 1994 Terms are added to this, it 
appears that the Court reversed the circuit of origin in 65% of all cases during 
the 1981 through 2012 Terms.  See The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: The 
Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: 
Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term: 
Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: 
Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 382 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: 
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: 
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 363 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: 
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 398 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: 
Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 354 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: 
Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: 
Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term: 
Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1985); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term: 
Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: 
IV. The Statistics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term: 
IV. The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304 (1982).   Bankruptcy case reversal rates 
and abrogation rates have remained similarly consistent over time.  During 
the period 1981 to 2012, the Court reversed the circuit of origin in bankruptcy 
cases at an average rate of 49.3%, and abrogated the underlying circuit court 
at an average rate of 56.7%. See supra Table I.  During the period 2005 through 
2011, the Roberts Court reversed the circuit of origin in bankruptcy cases at a 
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courts from which the cases arise.  Table II trims the data to 
create a closer parallel between the datasets by comparing only 
bankruptcy cases in the 2005 through 2011 Terms to all cases 
that arose only in the eleven numbered circuits and the District 
of Columbia in the 2005 through 2011 Terms (the “trimmed 
data”).  To further highlight the potential implications of issue 
disparity, Table II adds habeas corpus data as well for this same 
period.155 
Columns 2 and 3 report the number of circuit of origin case 
observations and aggregate affirm / reverse rates, for: overall 
cases, bankruptcy cases and habeas corpus cases.  Columns 4 
and 5 report the number of circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit 
case observations and aggregate approve / abrogate rates, 
during this same period.  Column 6 reports the degree of 
significance, if any, of the difference between affirm / reverse 
rates and approve / abrogate rates, during this same period.  
Column 5 reports the degree of significance, if any, of the 
difference between (i) bankruptcy abrogation rates and overall 
abrogation rates, (ii) habeas corpus abrogation rates and overall 
abrogation rates, and (iii) bankruptcy abrogation rates and 
habeas corpus abrogation rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comparable average rate of 46.7% and abrogated the underlying circuit court 
at a comparable average rate of 48.8%.  See infra Figure 5. 
155. The Hangley Study does not distinguish state and federal habeas 
corpus cases.  Hangley Study, supra note 104. 
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Table II 
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate 
Overall, Bankruptcy, Habeas Corpus 
Roberts Court 2005 - 2011 Terms 
Circuits 1-11 and DC* 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
Issue 
Presented 
Origin 
only: 
Number  
of Cases 
Origin 
only: 
Affirm/ 
Reverse 
Number 
Rate 
 
Origin & 
Sleeper: 
Number 
of Cases 
 
Origin & 
Sleeper: 
Approve/ 
Abrogate 
Number 
Rate 
Significanc
e of 
Difference 
Between 
Affirm/ 
Reverse 
Rate and 
Approve/ 
Abrogate 
Rate 
All Issues 432 126–306 
29.4–70.6 % 
1187 533–654 
44.9–55.1% 
Significant 
p < 0.0001 
Bankruptcy 
Cases 
15 8–7 
53.5–46.7 % 
43 22–21 
51.2–48.8% 
Not 
significant 
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(deviation 
from overall 
rate is not 
significant, 
p=0.4182) 
p=0.8886 
Habeas 
Corpus 
Cases 
53 7–46 
13.2–86.8 % 
86 19–67 
22.1–77.9% 
(deviation 
from overall 
rate is 
significant, 
p<0.00001) 
Not 
Significant 
p=0.1743 
Source of Roberts Court data: Hangley Study Exhibits I, II 
Source of bankruptcy data and all statistical analysis: Table I; 
Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT Reversals 
WinLoss Overview 
*Excludes Federal Circuit, Specialized Federal Courts, and State 
Supreme Courts 
 
These trimmed data reveal the same comparative 
relationships as the untrimmed data; i.e., Roberts Court Dataset 
overall reversal rates (approximately 71%) are significantly 
higher than overall abrogation rates (approximately 55%);156 
bankruptcy reversal rates (approximately 47%) are not 
significantly different than bankruptcy abrogation rates 
(approximately 49%); 157 and Roberts Court overall abrogation 
rates (approximately 55%) are not significantly different than 
bankruptcy abrogation rates (approximately 49%).158  In 
 
156. See supra Table II (p<0.0001).  Compare to untrimmed Roberts Court 
data, supra note 154. 
157. See supra Table II (p=0.8886). 
158. See supra Table II (p=0.4182). 
The Supreme Court decided fifteen bankruptcy cases between 2005 and 2011.  
The Court affirmed the circuit of origin in eight cases, and reversed the circuit 
of origin in seven cases, for an aggregate average affirm / reverse rate of 53.3 / 
46.7%.  See Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix I, supra note 
116; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: WinLoss Overview, 
supra note 139.  During this same period, there were a total of forty-three 
underlying court of appeals bankruptcy case decisions.  The Court agreed with 
the lower courts in twenty-two cases, and abrogated the lower courts in twenty-
one cases, for an aggregate average approve / abrogate rate of 51.2% to 48.8%.  
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contrast, although habeas corpus reversal rates (approximately 
87%) are not significantly different than habeas corpus 
abrogation rates (approximately 78%); 159 habeas corpus 
abrogation rates (approximately 78%) are significantly higher 
than overall abrogation rates (approximately 55%).160  Figures 5 
and 6 illustrate these comparisons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5, Source: Table I, Table II 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the comparison between reversal rates 
and abrogation rates for all cases, bankruptcy cases, and habeas 
corpus cases in the Roberts Court, applying the trimmed data 
reported in Table II. 
 
 
 
Id. The fifteen bankruptcy circuit of origin cases account for approximately 
3.5% of the 432 circuit of origin cases the Court decided from the First through 
Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits during this period. Id.  Similarly, 
the forty-three bankruptcy origin plus sleeper cases account for approximately 
3.6% of the 1187 origin and sleeper circuit cases the Court considered from the 
First through Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits during this period. 
See supra Table II. 
159. See supra Table II (p=0.1743). 
160. See supra Table II (p<0.00001). 
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Figure 6, Source: Table II 
 
As Table II reports and Figures 5 and 6 illustrate, there is 
no statistically significant difference between reversal rates and 
abrogation rates for bankruptcy cases or habeas corpus cases.161 
In contrast, there is a highly significant difference between 
reversal rates and abrogation rates in overall cases, combined.162 
In other words, the profile of a consolidated-issue comparison of 
reversal and abrogation rates looks different than the profile of 
a single-topic comparison. Consistent with this observation, the 
Court appears to disagree with the lower courts (both through 
reversal and abrogation) at a significantly higher rate in a least 
one identified area of law (i.e., habeas corpus cases), than in 
either another identified area (i.e., bankruptcy cases), or in all 
cases combined.163 
These comparisons are important, for purposes of this 
Article, because they introduce serious questions regarding the 
viability of comparing the circuits’ respective performance before 
the Supreme Court based on any measure of accord that 
 
161. See supra Table II; infra Figure 8.  The difference between Roberts 
Court bankruptcy reversal rates and bankruptcy abrogation rates is not 
statistically significant. Table II (p=0.8886). The difference between Roberts 
Court habeas corpus reversal rates and habeas corpus abrogation rates is not 
statistically significant. Table II (p=0.1743). 
162. See supra Table II; infra Figure 8.  The difference between Roberts 
Court overall reversal rates and overall abrogation rates is strongly significant 
(p<0.0001). 
163. Habeas corpus abrogation rates are significantly higher than all 
issue abrogation rates (p<0.0001). See supra Table II. 
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aggregates multiple issues. If the circuits routinely encounter, 
decide, and ultimately send the Supreme Court different 
proportions of cases from areas of law in which the Court 
inherently disagrees with all of the circuits at significantly 
different rates, issue disparity may help explain differences in 
the circuit courts’ apparent rates of discord with the Court. 
A simple hypothetical highlights this problem. Suppose that 
the Court disagrees with the circuit courts (all circuit courts) in 
habeas corpus cases around 80% of the time. Suppose that, in 
contrast, the Court disagrees with the circuit courts (all circuit 
courts) in some other area of law (e.g., bankruptcy) around 50% 
of the time, and perhaps in other areas of the law at rates lower 
than 50%. Suppose, finally, that the cases an average circuit 
sends the Court for review include about 7% high-disagreement 
rate habeas corpus cases. If a particular circuit (perhaps one 
with a large prison population? 164) sends the Court a 
disproportionate share of high-disagreement habeas corpus 
cases (say, 10 or 15%) as compared to low-disagreement cases, 
that circuit may appear to have a higher rate of discord with the 
Court than a circuit that sends the Court an average or below 
average share of high-disagreement cases. 
 
164. The questions raised in this section regarding the potential reasons 
the circuits might send the Court different issues for review are beyond the 
scope of this Study and merit separate depth of analysis. It is, however, 
interesting to note that the two circuits with higher than average rates of 
habeas review and higher apparent rates of discord with the Court also house 
a disproportionate share of the national incarcerated population. State by state 
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics reveal an average percent of the 
national incarcerated population (2,257,267) per circuit of approximately 
7.85%, whereas the Ninth Circuit houses approximately 17% of the national 
incarcerated population (380,615) and the Sixth Circuit houses approximately 
10% of the national incarcerated population (222,264). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov (last updated Dec. 17, 2015); The Sentencing 
Project Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY FOR 
REFORM, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2015); Sara Mayeux, Mass Incarceration: Breaking Down the Data by State, 
PRISON L. BLOG (July 13, 2010), 
http://prisonlaw.worlpress.com/2010/07/13/mass-incarceration-breaking-
down-the-data-state-by-state/. Similarly, based on preliminary calculations 
that warrant more targeted analysis, during the 2005 through 2011 period, 
habeas corpus cases made up on average about 7% of the cases reviewed from 
each circuit, but 14% of the cases reviewed from the Ninth Circuit and 15% of 
the cases reviewed from the Sixth Circuit. 
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Exploring the potential implications of issue disparity 
would, at a minimum, require rigorous analysis of: whether the 
Court disagrees with the circuits (all circuits) at significantly 
different rates depending on the types of issues presented 
(habeas corpus, for example); if so, what factors might drive 
those differences; whether different circuits send the Court 
different percentages of high-disagreement and low-
disagreement types of issues for review; whether any such 
differences are significant; and, if so, what factors might drive 
the disparity in issues that arise in different circuits. This type 
of analysis might shed light on the effects of issue disparity, as 
well as on the interplay between issue disparity, on the one 
hand, and the balance between the Court’s split resolving 
function and other bases for granting review, on the other hand. 
The importance of these unanswered questions mandates 
deeper study of how factors such as issue disparity affect 
Supreme Court / circuit court accord. Although rejecting affirm 
/ reverse rates as the basis for measuring Supreme Court / circuit 
court accord is essential to reduce the types of obvious error this 
Study examines, merely adopting approve / abrogate rates 
instead, without controlling for issue disparity and other 
variables, would remain insufficient to support definitive 
conclusions regarding the relative degree of accord between the 
Court and the circuits. 
Part IV.C disaggregates reversal and abrogation data by 
circuit, and provides additional insight into the challenges that 
sleeper circuit data and issue disparity raise for using affirm / 
reverse rates to measure agreement between the Court and the 
circuits. 
 
C.    Differences Between Affirm / Reverse Rates and Approve / 
Abrogate Rates: Disaggregated by Circuit 
 
Part V.C compares simple circuit of origin only case 
disposition rates (affirm / reverse) to overall circuit of origin plus 
sleeper circuit rates (approve / abrogate) on a disaggregated 
(circuit-by-circuit) basis. 
 
1.  Employing Statistical Analysis to Measure Significance: 
Roberts Court Dataset, Disaggregated by Circuit 
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The Hangley Study reports simple percentage reversal and 
abrogation rates for all Roberts Court merits cases during the 
2005 through 2011 Terms.165 These data reveal circuit-by-circuit 
reversal rates ranging from 47% to 82%, and abrogation rates 
ranging from 43% to 68%.166 The Roberts Court Dataset converts 
the Hangley Study data from summary format to individual 
observations and applies statistical analysis tools to determine 
the probability that the observed differences between these rates 
are significant.167 The Roberts Court Dataset reveals that (i) 
including sleeper circuit data moderates success rates for eleven 
of the twelve circuits; and (ii) the differences between reversal 
rates and abrogation rates are statistically significant for four of 
the twelve circuits, individually.168 Table III reports these 
findings. The implications are discussed following Table III. 
Column 2 reports the number of cases in which the Court 
granted certiorari to each circuit as circuit of origin.169 Column 
3 reports the number of those cases in which the Court affirmed 
/ reversed each circuit, and the affirm / reverse rate for each 
circuit. Column 4 reports the overall number of cases that arose 
in each circuit as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit.  Column 5 
reports the number of those cases in which the Court approved / 
abrogated each circuit’s position, and the overall approve / 
abrogate rate for each circuit. Column 6 reports how far each 
circuit’s individual abrogation rate deviates from the aggregate 
mean abrogation rate and indicates the significance of that 
deviation. Column 7 reports the significance, if any, of the 
difference between reversal rates and abrogation rates for each 
circuit, individually. 
 
 
 
 
165. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibit I. 
166. Id. 
167. See supra note 104. 
168. The total number of cases reported in Table III differs from the total 
number of cases reported in the Hangley Study because Table III does not 
include cases from the state supreme courts or the Federal Circuit.  The 
balance of the data in Table III is drawn directly from the Hangley Study.  See 
Hangley Study, supra note 104. 
169. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibits I & II. 
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Table III 
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate 
Disaggregated by Circuit 
Roberts Court 2005-2011 Terms 
Column 
1 
Column 
2 
Column  
3 
Column 
4 
Column  
5 
Column  
6 
Column  
7 
Circuit Number 
of cases 
Origin 
only 
Affirm / 
Reverse 
Number 
Percent 
Origin 
only 
Number 
of cases 
Origin & 
Sleeper 
Approve/
Abrogate 
Number 
Percent 
Origin & 
Sleeper  
Abrogate 
Rate as 
Percent of 
Aggregate 
Mean 
Abrogate Rate 
(55.10%) 
Showing 
significance 
Significance 
of Difference 
Between 
Reverse 
Rate and 
Abrogate 
Rate 
1 15 8–7 
53–47 % 
77 32–45 
42–58 % 
106% 
p=0.5676 
p=0.4056 
2 41 12–29 
29–71 % 
119 55–64 
46–54 % 
98% 
p=0.7835 
p=0.1063 
3 23 9–14 
39–61 % 
83 47–36 
57–43 % 
79% 
p=0.0382 
p=0.1395 
4 26 9–17 
35–65 % 
83 42–41 
51–49 % 
90% 
p=0.3136 
p=0.1568 
5 32 10–22 102 48–54 96% p=0.1171 
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31–69 % 47–53 % p=0.6749 
6 38 7–31 
18–82 % 
105 35–70 
33–67 % 
121% 
p=0.0220 
p=0.0848 
7 32 10–22 
31–69 % 
110 59–51 
54–46 % 
84% 
p=0.0787 
p=0.0257 
8 22 5–17 
23–77 % 
82 38–44 
46–54 % 
97% 
p=0.8003 
p=0.0463 
9 128 28–100 
22–78 % 
201 64–137 
32–68 % 
124% 
p=0.0005 
p=0.0498 
10 18 8–10 
44–56 % 
75 40–35 
53–47 % 
85% 
p=0.1552 
p=0.5033 
11 37 13–24 
35–65 % 
94 44–50 
47–53 % 
97% 
p=0.7210 
p=0.2282 
DC 20 7–13 
35–65 % 
56 29–27 
52–48 % 
87% 
p=0.3123 
p=0.2019 
 Total: 
432  
 126–306 
29.40–
70.60 % 
Total: 
1187 
 
 533-654 
44.90–
55.10 % 
 
 p<0.0001 
Source of Raw Data: Hangley Study, Exhibit I 
Source of Analysis: Roberts Court Dataset; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court 
Database, filename: SCT Reversals Analysis of Hangley Data 
Key: Boldfaced type indicates abrogation rates. Boldfaced italic type indicates 
deviations that have at least a mild degree of statistical significance. 
 
Table III and the following analysis evaluate the reliability 
of circuit-by-circuit reversal rate data from two perspectives. 
First, measuring differences between individual circuits’ 
reversal rates and abrogation rates demonstrates that reversal 
rates do not accurately capture the degree to which each circuit’s 
decisions are in accord with the Court’s decisions (Table III 
Column 7 and Figure 7). Second, measuring the extent to which 
each circuit’s abrogation rate deviates from the mean abrogation 
rate provides the basis for determining whether apparently 
higher or lower rates of accord are significant, and establishes 
an accurate starting point for analyzing factors that might affect 
differences in accord between the Court and the individual 
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circuits (such as, perhaps, issue disparity) (Table III Column 6 
and Figure 8). 
First, the data reported in Table III reveal how the inclusion 
of the sleeper circuits affects apparent success rates for each 
circuit. These disaggregated data heighten the previously 
identified concerns (in the context of aggregate data) with using 
simple reversal data to draw inferences about circuit courts’ 
discord with the Court.170 Table III reveals that adding sleeper 
circuit data to circuit of origin data moderates the circuits’ 
individual success rates (compare Column 3 and Column 5).  Not 
only is the mean abrogation rate (approximately 55%) 
significantly closer to the fiftieth percentile than the mean 
reversal rate (approximately 71%),171 but each circuit’s 
individual result also moderates (that is, moves closer to the 
fiftieth percentile) when sleeper circuit data are included (other 
than the First Circuit).172 Moreover, for every one of these 
circuits (again, excluding the First Circuit), the moderation is in 
a positive direction of accordance. In other words, when sleeper 
circuit data are included (i.e., using “approve” as the measure of 
accord), every circuit (other than the First Circuit) shows a rate 
of accord with the Court that is higher than its apparent rate of 
accord using only circuit of origin data (i.e., using “affirm” as the 
measure of accord). 
Simple affirm / reverse data (Column 3) show only one 
circuit with an accord rate within five points of the fiftieth 
percentile,173 and only one additional circuit within ten points.174 
Three circuits have simple affirm / reverse rates more than 
twenty-five points beyond the fiftieth percentile.175 Overall 
approve/abrogate data (Column 5), in comparison, show four 
 
170. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 136, 143-46 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra Table III (bottom row). 
172. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5.  It is difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions regarding the First Circuit because its circuit of origin record is 
affected by a small dataset; reversal and abrogation rates are both close to 50%; 
and the difference between reversal rate and abrogation rate is not statistically 
significant (p=0.4056). 
173. This is the First Circuit.  See supra Table III, Column 3. 
174. This is the Tenth Circuit.  See supra Table III, Column 3. 
175. These are the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits.  See supra Table III, 
Column 3. 
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circuits within five points of the fiftieth percentile, 176 two 
additional circuits within ten points,177 and every circuit within 
twenty-five points of the fiftieth percentile.178 
Similarly, the inclusion of sleeper circuit data moderates the 
presumed extremes of discord. The highest individual circuit 
reversal rate is 82%; the highest individual circuit abrogate rate 
is 68% (Column 5).  In comparison, six circuits show simple 
reversal rates in excess of 68% (Column 3).179 Figure 7 illustrates 
the divergence between reversal rates and abrogation rates, by 
circuit, in the Roberts Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7, Source: Table III 
 
Table III, Column 7, reports the statistical significance of 
the divergences illustrated by Figure 7.  Not only is the 
divergence between aggregate reversal and abrogation rates 
highly significant, the divergence between reversal rates and 
abrogation rates is statistically significant (at least mildly) for 
 
176. These are the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.  See supra 
Table III, Column 5. 
177. These are the First and Fourth Circuits.  See supra Table III, Column 
5. 
178. See supra Table III, Column 5. 
179. These are the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits.  See supra Table III, Column 3. 
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four of the circuits, individually (namely, the Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits).180 In other words, using simple 
reversal rates to measure the degree to which the Court 
“disagrees” with these circuits, individually, would be 
significantly erroneous. These differences, alone, demonstrate 
the unreliability of using reversal rates to compare circuit courts’ 
relative success rates before the Supreme Court. 
The Roberts Court Dataset reveals additional errors in 
analysis and conclusions that would arise from employing 
reversal rates rather than abrogation rates to measure 
individual circuits’ accord with the Court.  For six circuits, the 
presumed “result” in terms of accord with the Supreme Court 
would be simply wrong. One circuit that would be recorded as 
“majority affirmed” using circuit of origin only data, is instead 
recorded as “majority abrogated” using circuit of origin plus 
sleeper circuit data.181 Five circuits would be recorded as 
“majority reversed” using circuit of origin only data, but as 
“majority approved” using circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit 
data.182 The degree of accord would also be misstated for every 
circuit.  Eleven of the twelve circuits’ success rates moderate 
(that is, move closer to the fiftieth percentile) when sleeper 
circuit data is added.183 
Second, Table III, Column 6, compares the circuits’ relative 
discord with the Supreme Court based upon the extent to which 
each circuit’s individual abrogation rate deviates from the 
aggregate mean abrogation rate for all Roberts Court cases 
(approximately 55%).184  Figure 8 illustrates these deviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
180. See supra Table III, Column 7.  The significance of the difference is 
strong for the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, and mild for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
181. This is the First Circuit.  See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5. 
182. These are the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of 
Columbia Circuits.  See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5. 
183. The only exception is the First Circuit.  See supra note 173. 
184. The aggregate mean abrogation rate in Roberts Court cases over 
seven years is 55.1%, excluding cases from the Federal Circuit and state 
supreme courts.  See supra Table III, Column 6. 
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Figure 8, Source: Table III 
Table III and Figures 7 and 8 reveal that four circuits’ 
abrogation rates deviate from the mean to some degree of 
significance. Particularly, the Court agrees more than average 
with the Third Circuit to a significant degree,185 and Seventh 
Circuit to a mildly significant degree.186 The Court disagrees 
more than average with the Sixth Circuit to a significant 
degree,187 and the Ninth Circuit to a more significant degree.188 
The other eight circuits’ abrogation rates deviate from the 
aggregate mean to a degree that has no greater significance than 
random chance. In other words, the degree to which the Court 
agrees with these circuits is not significantly different than the 
degree to which the Court agrees with the other circuits. 
For purposes of this Article, these comparisons reveal that 
simple reversal rates do not reliably reflect the comparative 
degree to which the Court agrees with the circuit courts of 
appeal. As previously discussed, however, attributing 
differences in the degree to which the Court agrees with the 
circuits to ideological compatibility or other factors would be 
purely speculative absent a rigorous study of the implications of 
issue disparity, as well as other variables.189 For example, there 
 
185. See supra Table III, Column 6 (p=0.0382). 
186. See supra Table III, Column 6 (p=0.0787). 
187. See supra Table III, Column 6 (p=0.0220). 
188. See supra Table III, Column 6 (p<0.0005). 
189. See supra note 120, Figures 5, 6, 8 and accompanying text; see also 
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is no obvious blue-state liberal / red-state conservative 
ideological divide separating the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 
which show less accord with the Court (comprising Kentucky 
(red), Michigan (blue), Ohio (purple), Tennessee (red), California 
(blue), Alaska (red), Hawaii (blue), Oregon (blue), Washington 
(blue), Montana (red), Idaho (red), Nevada (purple), Arizona 
(red) and Guam) from the Seventh and Third Circuits, which 
show greater accord with the Court (comprising Illinois (blue), 
Indiana (pink), and Wisconsin (blue), Delaware (blue), New 
Jersey (blue) and Pennsylvania (blue)).190 Further empirical 
study is necessary to explore whether any patterns of issue 
disparity, circuit size, or other variables distinguish these 
circuits.191 This Article does not speculate on matters of ideology 
or issue disparity, but rather, cautions against drawing 
unsupported ideological or other inferences from differences in 
either reversal or abrogation rates without rigorous study of and 
control for factors that might contribute to those differences. 
 
2.   Significance: Bankruptcy Dataset, Disaggregated by 
Circuit 
 
The Bankruptcy Dataset examines Supreme Court accord on 
a circuit-by-circuit basis, for all bankruptcy cases during the 
1981 through 2012 Supreme Court Terms (Table IV), comparing 
circuit of origin only data (affirm / reverse rates) to circuit of 
origin plus sleeper circuit data (approve / abrogate rates). 
Including sleeper circuit data in the analysis of bankruptcy 
cases moderates success rates for most circuits individually and 
reveals differences in circuit-by-circuit success rates that are 
significant enough to warrant rejecting the use of simple 
reversal rates as a basis for comparing the circuits’ relative 
performance before the Court.192 
 
infra Figures 13, 14, and accompanying text. 
190. See Paul Starr, Red State, Blue State: Polarization and the American 
Situation, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://prospect.org/article/red-state-blue-state-polarization-and-american-
situation (reporting results of four presidential elections, 2000 through 2012). 
191. For example, might the Sixth and Ninth Circuit have 
disproportionately high prison populations and send the Court for review 
disproportionately high numbers of habeas corpus cases? See supra note 164. 
192. See infra Table IV, notes 190-211 and accompanying text. 
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Column 2 reports the number of bankruptcy cases in which 
the Court granted certiorari to each circuit as circuit of origin. 
Column 3 reports the number of those cases in which the Court 
affirmed / reversed each circuit, and the simple affirm / reverse 
rate for each circuit. For example, the Court granted certiorari 
to the Third Circuit in seven cases, and affirmed the Third 
Circuit in six of those cases, for an 86% simple affirm rate.193 
Column 4 reports the overall number of bankruptcy cases 
that arose in each circuit as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit 
combined. Column 5 reports the number of those cases in which 
the Court approved / abrogated each circuit’s position, and the 
overall approve / abrogate rate for each circuit.  For example, 
although the Court granted certiorari to the Third Circuit in 
only seven cases, the Court granted certiorari to some other 
circuit to resolve a circuit split in seventeen additional cases in 
which a Third Circuit decision had contributed to the split.194  
Thus, the Court reviewed, directly or indirectly, twenty-four 
Third Circuit decisions. If one considers only the seven cases in 
which the Court granted certiorari to the Third Circuit, the 
Third Circuit’s 86% affirm rate is impressive. If, however, one 
includes the Third Circuit’s sleeper decisions, the circuit’s 
overall approval rate of 46% hews very close to the fiftieth 
percentile, and flips from 86% majority agree between the Third 
Circuit and the Supreme Court to 54% majority disagree.195 
Column 6 reports how far each circuit’s individual 
abrogation rate deviates from the aggregate mean abrogation 
rate of approximately 57%. For example, the Third Circuit’s 
abrogation rate of 54% is 95% of the mean, which is not a 
statistically significant difference.196 
 
193. See infra Table IV, Column 3; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court 
Database, Appendix III, supra note 116 (setting forth, by circuit, each circuit 
of origin and sleeper circuit decision in this Study, and identifying each 
circuit’s circuit of origin decisions). 
194. See supra Table III, Column 3; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court 
Database, Appendix II, supra note 116 (setting forth, by Supreme Court 
decision, each circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decision, and identifying the 
circuit of origin decision underlying each Supreme Court decision); Bankruptcy 
Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix III, supra note 116 (setting forth, by 
circuit, each circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decision in this Study, and 
identifying each circuit’s circuit of origin decisions). 
195. See infra Table IV, Columns 4, 5. 
196. See infra Table IV, Column 6. 
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Table IV 
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate 
Disaggregated by Circuit 
Bankruptcy Cases 1981-2012 Terms 
Column 
1 
Column 
2 
Column 
3 
Column 
4 
Column 5 Column 6 
Circuit Number 
of Cases 
Origin 
only 
Affirm/ 
Reverse 
Number 
Percent 
Origin 
only 
Number 
of cases 
Origin & 
Sleeper 
Approve/ 
Abrogate 
Number 
Percent 
Origin & 
Sleeper  
Abrogate 
Rate as 
Percent of 
Aggregate 
Mean 
Abrogate 
Rate 
(56.97%) 
1 4 3–1 
75–25 % 
  9 6–3 
67–33 % 
59% 
2 6 2–4 
33–67 % 
19 10–9 
53–47 % 
83% 
3 7 6–1 
86–14 % 
24 11–13 
46–54 % 
95% 
4 5 2–3 
40–60 % 
24 12–12 
50–50 % 
88% 
5 6 3–3 
50–50 % 
23 10–13 
43–57 % 
99% 
6 8 5–3 
63–37 % 
25 12–13 
48–52 % 
91% 
7 7 3–4 
43 - 57 
% 
19 4–15 
21–79 % 
139% 
8 9 4–5 26 11–15 102% 
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44–56 % 42–58 % 
9 9 5–4 
56–44 % 
34 12–22 
35–65 % 
114% 
10 9 5–4 
56–44 % 
23 11–12 
48–52 % 
92% 
11 5 0–5 
0–100 % 
22 7–15 
32–68 % 
120% 
DC 1 1–0 
100–0 % 
  3 2–1 
67–33 % 
59% 
 Total: 76 39–37 
51.32–
48.68 % 
Total: 
251 
 
108–143 
43.03–56.97% 
 
 
Source: Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT 
Reversals WinLoss Overview 
Key: Boldfaced type indicates abrogation rates. 
 
As with the Roberts Court Dataset, this analysis evaluates 
the reliability of reversal rate data from two perspectives, 
elaborated below. First, measuring differences between 
individual circuits’ reversal rates and abrogation rates 
demonstrates that simple reversal rates do not accurately 
capture the degree to which each circuit’s decisions are in accord 
with the Court’s decisions (Table IV Col. 3, 5 and Figure 9). 
Second, measuring the extent to which each circuit’s abrogation 
rate deviates from the mean abrogation rate provides the basis 
for determining whether apparently higher or lower rates of 
accord are significant, and establishes an accurate starting point 
for analyzing factors that might affect differences in accord 
between the Court and the individual circuits. (Table IV Col. 6 
and Figure 10). 
First, these data reveal how the inclusion of the sleeper 
circuits affects apparent success rates for each circuit. As with 
the Roberts Court overall data,197 these effects reinforce the 
unreliability of using simple reversal data to draw inferences 
about circuit courts’ accord with the Court.198 Table IV reveals 
that adding sleeper circuit data to circuit of origin data generally 
 
197. See supra Table III and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 136, 143-46 and accompanying text. 
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moderates the circuits’ individual success rates in bankruptcy 
cases.199 Although the aggregate mean abrogation rate is not 
significantly different than the aggregate mean reversal rate in 
bankruptcy cases,200 all but four circuits’201 results moderate 
(that is, move closer to the fiftieth percentile) when sleeper 
circuit data are included. Simple affirm / reverse data show only 
one circuit with a rate of accord within five points of the fiftieth 
percentile,202 and five circuits within ten points.203 Overall 
approve / abrogate data, in contrast, show five circuits within 
five points of the fiftieth percentile,204 and seven circuits within 
ten points.205 
Similarly, the inclusion of sleeper circuit data moderates the 
presumed extremes reflected in affirm / reverse data. The 
highest individual circuit affirm rate in bankruptcy cases is 
100%; the highest individual circuit approve rate is 67%. The 
highest individual circuit reverse rate is 100%; the highest 
individual circuit abrogate rate is 79%.206 
 
199. Compare supra Table IV, Column 3, with Table IV, Column 5. 
200. Table IV reports an aggregate circuit of origin rate of approximately 
51% affirm, compared to origin plus sleeper circuit rate of approximately 43% 
approve, and an aggregate circuit of origin rate of approximately 49% reverse, 
compared to an aggregate origin plus sleeper circuit rate of approximately 57% 
abrogate.  See supra Table IV. The difference between the affirm / reverse rate 
and approve / abrogate rate is not statistically significant; p = 0.2044. 
201. These are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.  See supra 
Table IV, Columns 3, 5. 
202. This is the Fifth Circuit.  See supra Table IV, Column 3. 
203. These are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  See 
supra Table IV, Column 3. 
204. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.  See 
supra Table IV, Column 5. 
205. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits.  See supra Table IV, Column 5. 
206. The Court reversed all five bankruptcy cases originating in the 
Eleventh Circuit, as circuit of origin.  The Court reviewed twenty-two Eleventh 
Circuit decisions overall, as origin plus sleeper circuit, which is a sufficiently 
robust number for purposes of comparison to the other circuits. See supra Table 
IV, Columns 2, 4. 
The District of Columbia Circuit, in contrast, sent the Court only one 
bankruptcy case, as circuit of origin, and only three cases as circuit of origin 
plus sleeper circuit over thirty-two years.  See supra Table IV, Columns 2, 4. 
Given the particular jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Circuit, it is 
predictably uncommon for bankruptcy cases to arise in that circuit.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1331 (2006 & Supp. 2013) (granting D.C. Circuit jurisdiction 
over appeals from the District Court for the District of Columbia sitting as the 
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Figure 11 illustrates the divergence between reversal rates 
and abrogation rates, by circuit, in bankruptcy cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11, Source: Table IV 
 
These differences between reversal rates and abrogation 
rates (in the context of bankruptcy cases over a thirty-two year 
period) again demonstrate that reversal rates do not accurately 
reflect circuit courts’ comparative accord with the Supreme 
Court. The small datasets make a demonstration of statistical 
significance difficult on a circuit-by-circuit basis.207 
Nevertheless, one circuit (the Third Circuit) does demonstrate a 
mildly significant statistical difference between reversal rates 
and abrogation rates.208 
 
highest court of a “state” or hearing a federal question). 
207. As reported in Table IV, no circuit has more than thirty observations 
as circuit of origin, and only one circuit (the Ninth Circuit) has more than thirty 
observations as origin plus sleeper circuit. See supra Table IV, Columns 2, 4. 
208. See supra Table IV (p=0.0654). The other circuits are as follows: First 
Circuit p=0.7867, Second Circuit p=0.4307, Fourth Circuit p=0.6967, Fifth 
Circuit p=0.7843, Sixth Circuit p=0.4906, Seventh Circuit p=0.2846, Eighth 
Circuit p=0.9143, Ninth Circuit p=0.2798, Tenth Circuit p=0.7054, Eleventh 
Circuit p=0.1541, and District of Columbia p=1.0.  See supra Table IV. 
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The bankruptcy data demonstrate additional errors that 
would arise from employing reversal rates rather than 
abrogation rates to measure individual circuits’ accord with the 
Court. For six circuits, the presumed “result” in terms of accord 
with the Supreme Court would be simply wrong. Four circuits 
that would be recorded as “majority affirmed” using circuit of 
origin only data, are instead recorded as “majority abrogated” 
using overall circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit data.209 One 
circuit would be recorded as “majority reversed” using circuit of 
origin only data, but as “majority approved” using circuit of 
origin plus sleeper circuit data.210 One circuit moves from 
apparent neutrality using circuit of origin only data to apparent 
discord using circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit data.211 The 
degree of accord would also be misstated for every circuit. Eight 
circuits’ success rates moderate (that is, move closer to the 
fiftieth percentile) when sleeper circuit data is added; four move 
farther from the fiftieth percentile.212 
Second, the data in Table IV compare the circuits’ discord 
with the Supreme Court based on each circuit’s deviation from 
the mean rate of discord (Column 6). Figure 12 illustrates the 
degree to which each circuit’s individual abrogation rate 
deviates from the mean abrogation rate for all bankruptcy 
cases.213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209. These are the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  See supra 
Table III, Columns 3, 5. 
210. This is the Second Circuit.  See supra Table III, Columns 3,5. 
211. This is the Fifth Circuit.  See supra Table III, Columns 3,5 (reporting 
50% affirm / reverse versus 43% - 57% approve / abrogate). 
212. Moving closer to the fiftieth percentile are the First, Second, Third, 
Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. Moving 
farther from the fiftieth percentile are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5. 
213. The aggregate mean abrogation rate in bankruptcy cases over thirty-
two years is 57%.  See supra Table I and Figure 2. 
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Figure 12, Source: Table IV 
In general, these data reveal that bankruptcy abrogation 
rates are relatively stable across circuits and do not vary 
significantly from reversal rates. Nine circuits’ abrogation rates 
are within twenty percentage points of the mean (six below 
mean, three above mean);214 five are within ten points (four 
below mean, one above mean).215 For example, the differences 
between the mean abrogation rate and the Ninth Circuit’s 
abrogation rate, which is 14% above the mean, or the Eleventh 
Circuit’s abrogation rate, which is 20% above the mean, have no 
greater statistical significance than random chance. The 
outlying result for the District of Columbia Circuit is not 
statistically significant because of the small number of cases 
from this circuit. A different result in one or two cases could 
dramatically affect the results. Similarly, First Circuit’s 
deviation from the mean is not statistically significant.216 The 
only other noteworthy outlier is the Seventh Circuit, with an 
abrogation rate 39% above the aggregate mean, which translates 
to mild statistical significance.217 In other words, the Court 
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit somewhat significantly more 
than average in the bankruptcy cases. None of the other circuits’ 
deviations from the mean abrogation rate is significant.218 
Again, it would be speculative to infer reasons for these 
differences without controlling for issue disparity and other 
variables. Rather, for purposes of this Study, although the 
 
214. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.  See supra Figure 12. 
215. These are the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.  See 
supra Figure 12. 
216. See supra Table III (p=0.1939). 
217. See supra Table III (p=0.0345). 
218. Results for the remaining circuits are as follows: Second Circuit 
p=0.4253, Third Circuit p=0.7897, Fourth Circuit p=0.5104, Fifth Circuit 
p=0.9666, Sixth Circuit p=0.6304, Eighth Circuit p=0.9423, Ninth Circuit p= 
0.3592, Tenth Circuit p=0.6569, Eleventh Circuit p=0.2825, and District of 
Columbia Circuit p=0.5518. 
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deviations are mild, they reinforce the conclusion that reverse / 
affirm data do not accurately reflect Supreme Court / circuit 
court accord. 
 
3.  Implications of Issue Disparity: Disaggregated by Circuit 
 
These findings again merit a brief detour regarding the 
potential implications of issue disparity. If the Court 
consistently disagrees with particular circuit courts more than 
others, one would expect to find similar patterns of discord 
without regard to time periods examined, or issues presented. 
To test whether such patterns of accord exist within the specific 
parameters of this Study, Figures 13 and 14 compare circuit-by-
circuit bankruptcy abrogation rates to Roberts Court overall 
abrogation rates. Figure 13 illustrates abrogation rates as a 
percentage of mean abrogation rates. Figure 14 illustrates these 
same data in the format of deviation from mean abrogation rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13, Source: Table III, Table IV 
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Figure 14, Source: Table III, Table IV 
 
In the Roberts Court Dataset (all issues), eight circuits’ 
abrogation rates are within twenty percentage points of the 
mean (seven below mean, one above mean),219 six are within ten 
points (five below mean, one above mean).220 In the Bankruptcy 
Dataset, nine circuits’ abrogation rates are within twenty points 
of the mean (six below mean, three above mean);221 and five are 
within ten points of the mean (four below mean, one above 
mean).222 
Several aspects of this comparison are notable. First, if the 
Court consistently disagrees with particular circuits more than 
others, one would expect circuit-by-circuit abrogation rates to 
 
219. Below and within twenty points of the mean are the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits; above and within ten 
points of the mean is the First Circuit.  See supra Figure 14. 
220. Below and within ten points of the mean are the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits; above and within ten points of the mean 
is the First Circuit.  See supra Figure 14. 
221. See supra Figure 14. 
222. See supra Figure 14. 
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move in lockstep, without regard to issue disparity. In other 
words, the errant circuits would experience extraordinary 
abrogation rates without regard to whether one examines cases 
arising in a single area of law, or all cases in the aggregate. 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 reveal, instead, incoherently scattered 
relationships between each circuit’s individual abrogation rate 
in bankruptcy cases and overall cases. In other words, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between deviation from 
the mean abrogation rate in Roberts Court cases and deviation 
from the mean abrogation rate in bankruptcy cases.223 
Second, three circuits’ Roberts Court overall abrogation 
rates deviate from the mean by more than twenty points. The 
Third Circuit is twenty-one points below the mean, the Sixth 
Circuit is twenty-one points above the mean, and the Ninth 
Circuit is twenty-four points above the mean.224 Given the 
numbers of cases from each of these circuits, these deviations 
are statistically significant for each of these three circuits.225 For 
the Ninth Circuit, the deviation is strongly significant.226 The 
Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate deviates from the mean by 
sixteen points (below mean), which is mildly significant for that 
circuit.227 None of the other circuits’ individual deviations from 
the mean are statistically significant.228 
These findings are quite different than the findings in 
bankruptcy cases, in which no circuit’s deviation from the mean 
is strongly significant.229 The only circuit that diverges 
somewhat significantly from the mean in both datasets is the 
Seventh Circuit.230  The Seventh Circuit’s deviation is mild in 
each dataset, however, and is essentially self-canceling because 
 
223. See supra Table IV (p=0.965348, Correlation = -0.01408). 
224. See supra Table IV and Figure 14. 
225. At least a mild significance is shown for each, as follows: Third 
Circuit p=0.0382, Sixth Circuit p=0.0220, and a strong significance of p=0.0005 
for the Ninth Circuit.  See supra Table III, Column 6. 
226. See supra Table IV (p=0.0005). 
227. See supra Table IV (p=0.0787). 
228. The results for the remaining circuits are as follows: First Circuit 
p=0.5676, Second Circuit p=0.7835, Fourth Circuit p=0.3136, Fifth Circuit 
p=0.6749, Eighth Circuit p=0.8003, Tenth Circuit p=0.1552, Eleventh Circuit 
p=0.7210, and District of Columbia Circuit p=0.3123.  See supra Table III, 
Column 6. 
229. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
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it is slightly above the mean in bankruptcy cases and slightly 
below the mean in Roberts Court overall cases.231 
The fact that the aggregated-issue Roberts Court Dataset 
produces more circuits that deviate significantly from the mean 
than the issue-specific Bankruptcy Dataset again highlights the 
need for further study regarding the potential implications of 
issue disparity on Supreme Court / circuit court accord. Why 
might circuits that do not display significant deviations in an 
issue-specific bankruptcy case study nevertheless display 
abrogation rates significantly above (Sixth and Ninth) or below 
(Third) the mean when all issues are aggregated? The 
preliminary evidence suggests that the mix of issues the circuits 
encounter and send to the Court for review may skew their 
apparent overall success rates before the Court. 
 
VI.    Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In today’s data-driven world, dedicated researchers make 
available to other researchers and to the public extensive raw 
data regarding the functioning of our legal institutions. As this 
Article empirically demonstrates, however, even the most 
authoritative data can lead to invalid results if those data do not 
capture the information essential to test a carefully constructed 
hypothesis. 
Supreme Court reversal rates do not embody sufficiently 
robust data to support valid conclusions regarding accord 
between the Court and the circuit courts of appeal, let alone to 
support inferences regarding the circuit courts’ relative 
ideological compatibility with the Supreme Court. 
Where more than one circuit has ruled on an issue, the grant 
of certiorari and consequent designation of the circuit of origin 
depend upon serendipitous variables that simple affirm / reverse 
 
231. The Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate of 79% in bankruptcy cases 
over thirty-two years is 139% of the aggregate mean of 56.97% for bankruptcy 
cases from all circuits. The Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate of 46% in Roberts 
Court cases over seven years is 84% of the aggregate mean of 55.10% for 
Roberts Court overall cases from all circuits. See supra Tables III, IV. No 
significance can be attributed to the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s abrogation 
rate exceeds the mean under both datasets because the deviation in the 
bankruptcy dataset is not statistically significant. p=0.3592.  See supra note 
218 and accompanying text. 
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rates do not capture. These include litigants’ and the Court’s 
selection discretion, factual nuance, and the order in which the 
circuits ruled on an issue. The Study this Article reports finds 
that this chaotic process results in affirm / reverse rates 
(considering only the circuit of origin) that differ significantly 
from approve / abrogate rates (considering circuit of origin and 
sleeper circuits). Consequently, any comparison of the circuits’ 
performance before the Court must account for circuit splits by 
incorporating sleeper circuit data in a comprehensive and 
meaningful way. 
Nevertheless, one cannot draw valid conclusions regarding 
Supreme Court / circuit court accord merely by replacing affirm 
/ reverse rates with approve / abrogate rates. A valid measure of 
accord must also control for the existence of and interaction 
among other critical variables, including issue disparity, circuit 
size, numbers of cases, and variation over time. Chief among 
these may be the problem of issue disparity, which interacts 
with and complicates each of the other variables. Comparing the 
circuits’ relative performance based upon any measure that 
aggregates disparate issues compares apples to bananas if: (i) 
different circuits send the Court different types of issues, and (ii) 
the Court inherently disagrees with the lower courts more 
frequently on certain types of issues as compared to others 
(perhaps relating to whether review was discretionary, and 
whether the law is neutral, evolving, controversial or 
ideological). 
The preliminary evidence this Study reports shows 
significant differences in the patterns of accord between the 
Court and the circuits in single topic datasets as compared to 
aggregated topic datasets. These patterns reveal themselves 
incidental to this Study’s focus on reversal rates. Consequently, 
more targeted studies are necessary to focus specifically on the 
implications of issue disparity, to determine how issue 
aggregation affects apparent rates of accord between the Court 
and the circuits, and to understand how issue disparity 
intersects with other factors such as the reason the Court 
granted review. Until these intersections are explored, Supreme 
Court reversal statistics will remain as diaphanous and 
deceptive as the mist. 
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Finally, the problems this Study reveals regarding reversal 
rate data lead inevitably to two questions: (i) do publication and 
examination of Supreme Court reversal rates serve any valid 
purpose, and (ii) if so, should publication of reversal rates be 
accompanied by caveats warning readers against misapplication 
of the data? 
Reversal rate data may reveal something about the Court’s 
role in correcting errors, but only in a context that recognizes 
and controls for the variety of roles Supreme Court review serves 
(such as resolving circuit splits). Typically, however, 
commentators misapply reversal rate data to compare the circuit 
courts’ relative performance before the Court rather than to 
explore error-correction. As a measure of Supreme Court / circuit 
court accord, reversal rate data suffer from the streetlight 
effect232 of being easy to locate, but invalid to answer the 
question presented. At best, researchers may innocently leap 
from reversal rate statistics to unwarranted conclusions 
regarding Supreme Court / circuit court accord, and to 
unsupportable inferences regarding the reasons for supposed 
patterns of discord. At worst, some commentators may 
conveniently employ reversal statistics to justify pre-existing 
biases.233 
To obviate these concerns, responsible publishers concerned 
with the misuse of Supreme Court reversal statistics should 
consider including prominent caveats noting the limited 
purposes for which reversal rate data are reported, and 
 
232. Data that are not valid for the purposes to which they are applied 
may be harmful, rather than simply worthless, because they contribute to 
actions and beliefs based upon erroneous “facts.” For explorations of the often 
repeated tale of a person searching under a streetlamp for something he lost 
elsewhere, see Evan Esar, “Did You Lose the Keys Here?” “No, But the Light Is 
Much Better Here.” QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/11/better-light/; David H. Freedman, 
Why Scientific Studies Are So Often Wrong: The Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER 
MAG. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-aug/29-why-
scientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect#.UdMyg1KhNsE (discussing 
how the “streetlight effect” can lead to invalid scientific studies). 
233. See Eisenberg, Origins, supra note 4, at 1736-37 (noting how the 
absence of reliable data allows self-interested parties to promote biased data); 
see also Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 362-65 (discussing popular 
perception and the media’s role in fomenting the Ninth Circuit’s reputation; 
citing examples); Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 1 (discussing public 
perceptions). 
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expressly disclaiming the applicability of these data to the 
question of Supreme Court/circuit court accord, absent control 
for circuit splits, issue disparity, circuit size and other critical 
variables. 
 
81
